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The phenomenon of greenwashing receives significant public and academic attention. So do the related
practices of bluewashing (regarding involvement with the United Nations Global Compact) and the use of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) as mere window dressing. The first essay in this dissertation provides a
conceptual and ethical analysis of these practices. It also criticizes some frameworks for using CSR as a tool for
increasing a firm’s economic performance. If CSR is to be taken seriously, rather than dismissed as a marketing
gimmick at best or a veil for corporate malfeasance at worst, then we cannot endorse CSR decisions being
reduced to considerations of economic performance.
On what basis should CSR decisions be made and evaluated? That is the research question that motivates this
dissertation’s second essay. I argue that any normative framework for CSR decision making must be based
primarily on ethical considerations (as opposed to considerations of firm financial performance). As one
possible such framework, I introduce effective altruism, a recent academic and social movement that
advocates using strong evidence and rigorous analysis to increase the positive impact one makes through
altruistic acts. Effective altruism provides a plausible framework for making and evaluating CSR whose main
purpose is to benefit other people. However, there are other types of CSR that implicate alternative moral
considerations—related to harms, rights violations, moral reconciliation, and reciprocity—that effective
altruism does not capture.
How do we distinguish between ethical and unethical ways of pursuing profit? The Market Failures Approach
to business ethics purports to provide an answer to this question. In the third essay of this dissertation, I argue
that it fails to do so. This failure stems from its reliance on Pareto efficiency as a core ethical principle. Many
ethically “preferred” tactics for seeking profit cannot be justified by appeal to Pareto efficiency. I argue that,
rather than Pareto efficiency, we should look to the value of wealth creation to understand the ethical
constraints on how market actors may pursue profit.
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ABSTRACT

THREE ESSAYS ON STRATEGY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Carson Young
Brian Berkey
The phenomenon of greenwashing receives significant public and academic attention. So
do the related practices of bluewashing (regarding involvement with the United Nations
Global Compact) and the use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) as mere window
dressing. The first essay in this dissertation provides a conceptual and ethical analysis of
these practices. It also criticizes some frameworks for using CSR as a tool for increasing
a firm’s economic performance. If CSR is to be taken seriously, rather than dismissed as
a marketing gimmick at best or a veil for corporate malfeasance at worst, then we cannot
endorse CSR decisions being reduced to considerations of economic performance.
On what basis should CSR decisions be made and evaluated? That is the research
question that motivates this dissertation’s second essay. I argue that any normative
framework for CSR decision making must be based primarily on ethical considerations
(as opposed to considerations of firm financial performance). As one possible such
framework, I introduce effective altruism, a recent academic and social movement that
advocates using strong evidence and rigorous analysis to increase the positive impact one
makes through altruistic acts. Effective altruism provides a plausible framework for
making and evaluating CSR whose main purpose is to benefit other people. However,
there are other types of CSR that implicate alternative moral considerations—related to
harms, rights violations, moral reconciliation, and reciprocity—that effective altruism
does not capture.
How do we distinguish between ethical and unethical ways of pursuing profit? The
Market Failures Approach to business ethics purports to provide an answer to this
question. In the third essay of this dissertation, I argue that it fails to do so. This failure
stems from its reliance on Pareto efficiency as a core ethical principle. Many ethically
“preferred” tactics for seeking profit cannot be justified by appeal to Pareto efficiency. I
argue that, rather than Pareto efficiency, we should look to the value of wealth creation to
understand the ethical constraints on how market actors may pursue profit.
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INTRODUCTION

One disadvantage of the three-essay dissertation model is that it produces a
fragmented final product. This introduction aims to remedy this, at least in part. It
provides a brief overview of some of the main theoretical approaches and assumptions I
have employed throughout these essays. I do not provide a full justification of my
theoretical approaches and assumptions, but I do make them explicit, and in some cases I
also indicate my main reasons for adopting them.

What is normative business ethics theory?
Philosophers of science (Giere, 1994; Suppe, 1972) distinguish between two
different perspectives on what Harris, Johnson, & Souder (2013) call “model-theoretic
knowledge accumulation” (442) in empirical scientific research. A law statement
perspective understands theories to consist of falsifiable general statements about the real
world. A model-theoretic perspective, by contrast, understands theories as models that
represent certain aspects of the real world, applying to a greater or lesser degree
depending on the circumstances. Schmidtz (2006), a political philosopher, extends this
model-theoretic perspective (without, to my knowledge, using that exact term) to
normative theorizing about justice. He claims that we should think of theories not as
arguments, as the law-statement perspective does, but as conceptual maps that represent a
terrain. (If this is not identical to the model-theoretic perspective, it certainly bears strong
resemblance to it).
vii

Though I believe the law statement perspective can be valuable for normative
business ethics, I myself adopt something closer to the model-theoretic perspective in the
essays in this dissertation. I think about moral truths—including (though not limited to)
particular facts about how a person should act in a given circumstance—as a terrain.
Understanding ethics requires understanding the contours of this terrain. Moral theories
are maps that represent the terrain. Theories, by necessity, involve simplification. This is
how theories help us achieve a better understanding of their subject matter. But
simplification also has a cost. Just as certain map projections represent some geographic
areas well even as they distort others, certain ethical theories capture some parts of the
ethical terrain well, even as they distort others. Of course, some theories (and projections)
are just bad, and ought to be discarded. But the mere fact that a theory distorts a certain
part of the ethical terrain does not mean that it has no value as a theory. An ethical theory
can have value by capturing certain parts of the moral terrain especially vividly. Ethical
truth, according to the model-theoretic perspective, resides not so much in ethical theories
themselves as in the terrain that ethical theories represent.
Thus, I do not think of normative business ethics theory as consisting primarily of
abstract principles providing necessary and sufficient conditions for moral rightness or
goodness (though such principles can play an important role in normative theorizing).
Business ethics theory should be practical. It should aid us in our attempts to understand
how business organizations should be run, how managerial decisions should be made,
and how people should act in situations that commonly arise in business. It should help
practitioners understand what behaving ethically in business requires.
viii

This discussion of a model-theoretic perspective for business ethics provides
some context for claims I make about the wealth creation approach I defend in essay 3.
The wealth creation approach identifies wealth as one important value for understanding
a certain part of the terrain of business ethics: the restrictions on how market actors may
permissibly pursue profit. The approach does not provide a law that tells us with certainty
whether employing a certain set of strategic tactics is permissible. Instead, it offers a
defeasible principle that highlights one important consideration for determining
permissibility. It represents an important contour in the ethical terrain of business.
The model-theoretic perspective is also reflected in the pluralist approach I
employ in essays 1 and 2. I do not choose to develop a normative theory of CSR by
adopting a specific version of Kantianism, Aristotelianism, contractarianism, or
utilitarianism and then applying that theory to CSR. Instead, I appeal to mid-level moral
principles to justify the conclusions I defend: do not free-ride on others’ investments in a
common resource, do not manipulate others, do not seriously harm others or violate their
rights, atone for (and compensate victims of) past wrongs, help the needy in effective
ways. Not everyone will agree with each of these principles as I have formulated them,
and people will certainly disagree about how they should be weighed against each other.
But I would submit that each of these principles is significantly less controversial than
any one comprehensive ethical theory. Arguments are generally stronger when they rely
on less controversial premises: by definition, controversial premises fail to garner the
endorsement of a significant proportion of one’s audience. Thus, I believe that I can
provide stronger arguments for the conclusions about CSR I defend by relying on a
pluralist set of common moral principles than on a single comprehensive moral theory.
ix

For precisely this reason, I sometimes go out of my way in the three essays to
deny that endorsing the positions I defend requires endorsing a particular comprehensive
moral theory. In essay 3, I deny that adopting my wealth creation approach requires
endorsing welfare consequentialism: the value of wealth can be justified not only by
appeal to welfare, but also by appeal to non-welfare considerations such as autonomy.
Similarly, in essay 2, I argue that we should understand effective altruism not as a deeply
consequentialist or utilitarian theoretical perspective—though it admittedly does require
endorsing some thin consequentialist assumptions about moral aggregation—but rather as
a reflection of the relatively commonsense idea that we should try to do more good
through our altruistic acts.

An institutional approach to business ethics
Business does not occur in an institutional vacuum. It takes place in profitoriented, bureaucratic organizations that compete against each other in a market. I
strongly agree with Heath (2014) that an adequate theory of business ethics must take the
institutional competitive market environment of business seriously. Trying to understand
the ethics of business without understanding the normative structure of competitive
market institutions is like trying to understand the ethics of being a lawyer without
recognizing the adversarial nature of the judicial system, or trying to understand the
ethics of a competitive team sport without recognizing that it involves a competition that
each team tries to win.
I thus disagree in important respects with claims like the one in the title of John
Maxwell’s book, There is No Such Thing as “Business” Ethics: There’s Only One Rule
x

for Making Decisions (Maxwell, 2007). We cannot develop an adequate understanding of
business ethics through simple application of abstract theoretical principles to business
contexts. However, I also do not go as far as Heath (2014), who appears to hold that
business ethics is best understood by looking for norms that are implicit in various parts
of the institutional environment of business, such as corporate law. I agree with the sort
of view Berkey (2016) defends, according to which general principles of morality and
justice apply to particular institutional contexts, including business and market contexts,
and give actors in those contexts direct reasons for action. However, I also believe that
institutional features can affect what general principles of morality and justice imply
about how one should act in a particular circumstance. Thus, in order to understand
business ethics, we must understand what (if anything) justifies competitive market
institutions. Then we must understand how the structure of competitive market
institutions—including the formal and informal norms governing the conduct of actors
that inhabit them—serves the values that justify them.
Essay 3 reflects this institutional approach to business ethics by specifying and
describing a certain value, wealth, that I believe serves as an important part of the overall
justification for competitive market institutions. Understanding how profit-seeking actors
in competitive market institutions create wealth can help us understand some important
ethical limits on how profit in competitive market institutions may be pursued.
One can also see this institutional approach to business ethics reflected in essay 1.
If businesses organizations, given the competitive environment in which they operate,
have a general orientation toward pursuing profit, why should they not have a profit
orientation toward corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Some prominent CSR scholars
xi

believe they should. The business case for CSR is a popular idea. In my view, however, it
is also a dangerous one, given how CSR is often understood. Adam Smith's (1776)
invisible hand justification of the profit motive does not generally hold for CSR. If we
view CSR primarily as way to gain or sustain competitive advantage or improve financial
performance, rather than a practice whose proper purpose is fundamentally an ethical
one, we risk countenancing what I call disingenuous CSR behavior—CSR that, like the
notion of bullshit Frankfurt (2009) has analyzed, is undertaken with insufficient regard
for the ends it purports to promote or protect. Viewing business firms as fundamentally
profit-oriented entities that inhabit a competitive market environment, as an institutional
approach to business ethics would have us do, helps to illuminate some potential dangers
of CSR that otherwise might not be apparent.

CSR: a term of art
In a broad sense, all three of the essays in my dissertation are about CSR, since
they all analyze and defend claims about how business firms should act toward certain
stakeholders and other members of society. After all, it is natural to understand ‘CSR’ to
refer to a set of responsibilities that businesses have toward certain stakeholders, society,
or the environment. When Milton Friedman argued that “there is one and only one social
responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game” (Friedman, 2002:
133), he was defending the position that business managers’ main responsibilities are
owed to the firm’s shareholders, rather than to society in the form of “providing
employment, eliminating discrimination, [and] avoiding pollution” (Friedman, 1970: 32).
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Friedman advances a position that is explicitly normative. For Friedman’s view to be a
view about CSR, then, the term ‘CSR’ must be understood to refer to something like a
firm’s actual fulfillment of its social responsibilities, or a firm’s successfully conducting
itself in accordance with what its social responsibilities require. A given act will only
qualify as CSR if it is an act that the firm has ethical reason to perform.
If we understand CSR in this way, a firm’s corporate social responsibility refers to
some subset of the overall set of ethical reasons that apply to that firm. Theories of CSR
as responsibilities clarify what a firm’s ethical responsibilities to society are, and which
actions those responsibilities require. The subfield of scholarly literature that addresses
CSR as responsibilities, then, is normative business ethics. Normative debates about
corporate governance defending shareholder primacy (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2002;
Marcoux, 2003) or normative stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston, 1995); about
corporate ownership and its implications (Rodin, 2005; Strudler, 2017); about whether
firms have a social responsibility to eliminate sweatshops from their supply chains
(Arnold & Bowie, 2003, 2007; Zwolinski, 2007); about whether, how, and to what extent
business firms ought to participate in political processes (Hussain & Moriarty, 2016;
Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Singer, 2018); these are the sorts of issues that CSR as
responsibilities encompasses. Theories of CSR as responsibilities have as their central
aim prescribing what businesses, from an ethical perspective, should do.
However, I was initially surprised to discover that many CSR researchers do not
understand CSR in the way just described. CSR has become a term of art. Rather than
referring primarily to responsibilities businesses have, CSR refers to a category of
activities that businesses do. One clue that someone is using this category of activity
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conception of CSR is that they speak or write of firms that ‘do CSR’—English syntax
allows us to speak of ‘doing’ activities, but not of ‘doing’ responsibilities.
This conception of CSR is often expressed in terms of intention: CSR activities
are those that are undertaken voluntarily (rather than in response to, e.g., a legal
requirement) and are intended or designed to provide benefits or mitigate harms to
stakeholders, society, or the natural environment (Barnett, 2007a; Mackey, Mackey, &
Barney, 2007; Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007; Rupp, Ganapathi, Aguilera, & Williams,
2006). But this notion of organizational intention is under-theorized (it is not clear what
constitutes organizational intention) and difficult to measure (to the extent that
organizational intention depends on organizational leaders’ internal mental states, it
cannot be observed directly). It is perhaps for this reason that scholarly management
literature often appeals to the notions of appearance and reflection of intention or social
purpose, rather than making CSR ascription dependent on actual intention (e.g. Matten &
Moon, 2008; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Thus, under the activities conception, we can
understand CSR to refer to activities that (1) appear to promote some apparently social or
ethical purpose beyond firm financial performance or (2) appear to reflect a commitment
on behalf of the firm to that ethical or social purpose.
As someone who employs a normative, philosophical methodology, it is tempting
to declare that this second conception of CSR represents a corruption of the term, and to
insist that CSR be reserved for the responsibilities conception.
However, I think it is more interesting to take the activities conception of CSR
seriously, instead of dismissing it. At any rate, this is what I attempt to do in essays 1 and
2. If CSR refers not to a firm’s ethical and social responsibilities, but instead to activities
xiv

a firm does that seem to promote or reflect a commitment on behalf of the firm to some
ethical or social purpose, how should we develop normative theory about CSR?
As essay 1 demonstrates, adopting this activities conception of CSR has important
implications for how firms may use CSR as a means for improving financial
performance. Under the responsibilities conception, CSR is ethical by definition: a firm
does CSR when it fulfills its normative responsibilities. The activities conception,
however, severs the connection between CSR and substantive ethical considerations. This
means that, perhaps surprisingly, certain kinds of CSR activity can be unethical. Indeed,
viewing CSR primarily as a source of strategic advantage risks countenancing ethically
problematic kinds of CSR such as greenwashing, bluewashing, and window dressing.
Decoupling CSR from substantive ethical considerations also opens up interesting
questions about what positive view we should adopt regarding how CSR decisions should
be made and evaluated. This is one of the main purposes of essay 2. Effective altruism
provides a plausible source of prescriptive guidance about CSR whose primary purpose is
beneficence. We must rely on other kinds of moral considerations—refraining from
serious harms and rights violations, atoning for (and compensating victims of) past
wrongs, reciprocity—for prescriptive guidance for CSR whose primary purpose is
something other than beneficence.
In this introduction, I have attempted to make explicit some of the main
methodological decisions I have made in the course of writing the three essays that
follow. I have also highlighted some main themes that unify the essays. My hope is that
these remarks will help readers understand how my dissertation essays relate to and
xv

support each other, and how they contribute to normative business ethics theory more
broadly.
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CHAPTER 1: What’s wrong with greenwashing?: The ethics of CSR as a marketing tool
I. Introduction
In the early 2000s, British Petroleum, colloquially known as BP, debuted a series
of marketing campaigns rebranding itself as an environmentally conscious energy
company. These campaigns celebrated its investments in green energy, encouraging the
public to associate BP with the slogan “beyond petroleum” rather than the fossil fuelevoking actual name of the company. The campaign was a success, winning the
American Marketing Association’s golden Effie award for advertising effectiveness in
2007 (Solman, 2008). Critics, however, were suspicious of BP touting its green bona
fides when the vast majority of its business remained in the extraction and processing of
fossil fuel. BP’s 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill seemed to confirm their suspicions. In
retrospect, the environmental activist group Greenpeace looks prescient for having
awarded BP its (satirical) Emerald Paintbrush award for greenwashing in 2008 (Gray,
2008).
BP is one of the most notorious examples of corporate greenwashing, but many
other firms have exhibited similar behavior, making public expressions that suggest a
commitment to sustainability that is not backed up by substantive action. Indeed,
greenwashing has achieved a sufficiently high profile to attract scholarly attention
(Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Laufer, 2003; Lyon & Montgomery, 2015). Nor is
sustainability the only domain in which companies have attempted to use the language of
corporate responsibility for public relations purposes in a way that is misleading in light
1

of their other practices. First, there is the analogous phenomenon of bluewashing. This
occurs when a firm uses its involvement with the United Nations Global Compact to
deflect attention away from poor human rights practices. For example, consider an
apparel firm that publicly touts its support for the UN Global Compact while sourcing
clothing from sweatshops that routinely violate their workers’ basic human rights. Then
there are also more general (and older) terms, such as “window dressing,” which is used
to describe corporate social responsibility (CSR) activity that is primarily about creating
the appearance of social responsibility (Friedman, 1970; Lin, 2010).
Intuitively, it seems obvious that there is something ethically problematic about
greenwashing, bluewashing, and CSR as mere window dressing (hereafter referred to as
“window dressing”). However, we lack a clear understanding of why behavior like
greenwashing is especially ethically problematic. It makes sense that environmentalists
would be critical of BP; environmentalists believe that we have strong reason to oppose
all major fossil fuel companies, given the environmental damage associated with the
extraction and use of fossil fuel. But why was BP, it seems, a special target of
environmentalist ire? After all, BP at least made some attempts to adopt greener
practices. Why should Greenpeace target BP rather than one of the other multinational
companies in the fossil fuel industry, some of which (we might imagine) are likely to
have engaged in practices at least as bad as (if not worse than) BP’s, but without BP’s
token sustainability efforts?
Plus, even if was hypocritical for BP to cloak itself in environmentalism while
making as much money as it could from fossil fuels, it is not immediately clear why this
2

is ethically worse than causing similar environmental damage without an accompanying
green public relations campaign. If the alternative is nihilism, perhaps hypocrisy is to be
preferred. Indeed, hypocrisy may sometimes play a role in bringing about eventual
improvements to firms’ behavior if hypocritical organizations experience pressure to
reduce discrepancies between talk and action (Christensen, Morsing, & Thyssen, 2013).
My aim in this paper is to clarify our conceptual and ethical understandings of
phenomena like greenwashing, bluewashing, and window dressing. I also discuss some
implications of my analysis for how we should think about CSR more generally,
especially regarding the use of CSR to improve economic performance. As I show,
because behavior like greenwashing is usually unethical, there are some important ethical
limits on how a manager may use CSR to advance the firm’s financial goals.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the phenomena of
greenwashing, bluewashing, and window dressing. I argue that these all qualify as
specific instances of a more general phenomenon that I label disingenuous CSR: CSR
activity that is undertaken with insufficient regard for the social or ethical end it purports
to advance or protect. In section III, I offer four reasons for why disingenuous CSR—
including greenwashing, bluewashing, and window dressing—is usually unethical: (1) it
likely reduces the overall amount and quality of CSR in society, (2) it often constitutes
morally impermissible free-riding, (3) it is often manipulative of stakeholders, and (4) it
may increase people’s propensity to engage in unethical behavior through the moral
licensing effect. Some might take issue with my use of the term ‘disingenuous CSR’ for
this sort of activity on the grounds that is seems odd to think of CSR as being unethical.
3

Is CSR activity not ethical by definition? Section IV argues that, given the conception of
CSR that is most prominent in the CSR literature, CSR is in fact not ethical by definition.
In other words, that an activity qualifies as CSR is neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition for that activity being ethical. In section V, I turn my attention to strategic
CSR: the idea that CSR can be a tool for gaining and sustaining competitive advantage.
Some scholars, notably McWilliams & Siegel (2001) and Husted & Salazar (2006), have
advocated an extreme version of strategic CSR according to which managers’ decisions
about CSR ought to be reduced to firm economic performance considerations. Managers,
on this view, should pursue CSR investments that contribute to maximizing profit, and
refrain from making CSR investments that are not expected to maximize profit. One
reason that this extreme version of CSR is problematic, I argue, is that it countenances
disingenuous CSR. Section VI addresses a specific argument from Husted & Salazar
(2006), which I call the invisible hand defense of strategic CSR. I show why this
argument fails to vindicate the view that managers ought to make decisions about CSR
primarily or exclusively on the basis of firm economic performance considerations.
Section VII concludes, offering some positive guidance about how managers can avoid
ethically problematic greenwashing, bluewashing, and window dressing behavior. I also
suggest some avenues for future research.

II. Greenwashing, bluewashing, window dressing: CSR as a public relations tool

4

In his famous broadside against CSR, Friedman (1970) suggests that much of
what people perceive to be socially responsible business conduct is actually ordinary,
profit-oriented business activity that is presented to the public as socially responsible for
public relations purposes. In the intervening years since Friedman’s essay, some more
specific terms have arisen to refer to similar phenomena that arise in certain domains of
seemingly socially responsible business behaviors. Greenwashing occurs when a firm
fosters a reputation for environmental sustainability as a façade to mask poor
environmental performance (Laufer, 2003). Bluewashing occurs when a firm uses its
association with the United Nations to help mask a poor human rights record (Berliner &
Prakash, 2015). While the scholarly study of bluewashing remains in relatively early
stages, an entire greenwashing literature has developed. This body of research attempts to
clarify the factors that drive greenwashing. Candidates include industry conditions, firm
performance, firm governance, the political-legal environment, and institutional demands
(e.g. Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Kim & Lyon, 2014; Marquis, Toffel, & Zhou, 2016;
Ramus & Montiel, 2005).
But to what, exactly, do the terms greenwashing, bluewashing, and windowdressing refer? A close reading of the literature on these concepts reveals several
different ways of understanding them. Friedman (1970: 426) defines “window dressing”
as the use of social responsibility as “a cloak for actions… that are entirely justified on
[the firm’s] own self-interest.” In other words, a firm engages in window dressing when it
represents ordinary business activity undertaken in order to improve bottom-line
economic performance as being done out of a commitment to social responsibility.
5

Note the difference between this understanding of window dressing and several
proposed definitions of greenwashing. Laufer (2003: 253) explains greenwashing as a
form “of disinformation from organizations seeking to repair public reputations and
further shape public images.” Other conceptualizations of greenwashing also identify it
with public relations campaigns that use disinformation to paint in a misleadingly
positive light the environmental performance of firms that fail to conduct themselves
sustainably (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Ramus & Montiel, 2005; Vos, 2009). Still, there
are subtle differences between this disinformation-based conception of greenwashing and
others that exist in the literature. For example, it seems that greenwashing does not
require disinformation in the strict sense of a firm making false claims about
environmental performance: Lyon & Montgomery (2015: 223) adopt a somewhat broader
conception that encompasses “communication that misleads people into forming overly
positive beliefs about an organization’s environmental practices or products.” This
conception of greenwashing, unlike disinformation-based conceptions, encompasses the
practice of making selective but true public claims about positive environmental actions
while neglecting to disclose negative environmental actions (Marquis et al., 2016).
Additionally, some conceptualizations understand greenwashing to necessarily
involve diverting public attention away from environmentally deficient underlying
behavior (e.g. Delmas & Burbano, 2011), while others only require that greenwashing
public communication paint an excessively rosy picture of the firm’s environmental
performance (e.g. Lyon & Montgomery, 2015). The latter could involve behavior that is
neutral from an ethical perspective (i.e. neither unethical nor especially ethically good),
6

and thus unproblematic when isolated from the accompanying public expression, but that
is then embellished to suggest that the firm behaves more sustainably than it actually
does. The former, on the other hand, require the underlying environmental behavior itself
to be negative.
There is much less literature on bluewashing than greenwashing, but the various
conceptions of bluewashing are roughly analogous to those we find in the domain of
greenwashing. Some scholars define bluewashing as taking part in the UN Global
Compact in order to distract public attention from conduct that is deficient from a human
rights protection point of view—the underlying human rights conduct must be subject to
negative assessment even when considered separately from the accompanying
communication (e.g. Bigge, 2004). Others require only that there be a divergence
between the firm’s underlying human rights conduct and its public presentation, which is
consistent with the underlying conduct being ethically neutral (Berliner & Prakash,
2015).

a. Disingenuous CSR
One of the contributions of this paper is to unify the various types of conduct I am
discussing—greenwashing, bluewashing, and window dressing—into a single broader
category. This will give us a clearer picture of why these behaviors are ethically
problematic.
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My proposal is that we should understand window-dressing, greenwashing, and
bluewashing to represent different instances of the more general phenomenon that I call
disingenuous CSR. This term is inspired by philosopher Harry Frankfurt's (2009)
pioneering work on a related idea. Frankfurt analyzes speech that is meant to persuade
but lacks consideration for the truth. One who engages in speech in this way cares only
about persuading their interlocutor, not about whether the content of the speech is true or
false, or whether the speech induces the interlocutor to adopt true or false beliefs.
Frankfurt’s focus is on a specifically discursive phenomenon. In other words, it
applies to speech. However, I propose that we understand ‘disingenuous CSR’ to refer
more broadly to CSR activity that is undertaken with insufficient regard for the social or
ethical ends it purports to advance or protect. Thus, firms that exploit the marketing and
public relations benefits of CSR without making a serious effort to deliver on the
commitments their marketing and public relations efforts suggest do CSR
disingenuously.
Understood in this way, disingenuous CSR provides a plausible conceptual
account of greenwashing, bluewashing, and window dressing: each of these involves
firms, in a certain domain, undertaking CSR activities with insufficient regard for the
environmental, social, or ethical end that activity purports to advance or protect. Apply
this definition to the “Beyond Petroleum” marketing campaign. BP presented itself as a
firm that had embraced a genuine commitment to protecting the long-term health of the
natural environment. However, BP’s conduct strongly suggests that it did not, as an
organization, actually take environmentally causes seriously in the way its marketing
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both explicitly stated and implicitly implied. A United States federal judge found BP’s
conduct to have been, at various points in time leading up to the Deepwater Horizon
explosion, reckless and grossly negligent, and that some of its most disastrous decisions
were motivated by profit (Barbier, 2011). This is consistent with the perception that,
aside from acquiring a relatively small solar energy company, BP was not giving
environmental concerns any significant weight in its corporate decision making during
the years when it was marketing itself as Beyond Petroleum. Its actions indicate that, as
an organization, it did CSR disingenuously, failing to exhibit the organizational virtues or
live up to the standards of conduct its CSR campaign portrayed. Thus, BP was guilty of
greenwashing, because it was guilty of disingenuous CSR in the domain of
environmental sustainability.
However, in addition to covering the conceptual space of greenwashing,
bluewashing, and window dressing, disingenuous CSR also extends beyond it. In other
words, there is an entire category of business conduct that is closely analogous to
greenwashing, bluewashing, and window dressing, but that has not been clearly named in
public and academic discourse in the way greenwashing and bluewashing have been.
Prototypical examples of greenwashing and bluewashing are discursive (this is less clear
for window dressing). A significant part of the Beyond Petroleum campaign was BP’s
corporate speech. But much disingenuous CSR is not primarily discursive in this way. I
worry that our lack of a concept to refer to this non-greenwashing, non-bluewashing
conduct may blind us to some of its ethically problematic aspects and impede our ability
to identify it when it occurs.
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To make my point concrete, consider the following example:
Bobs Boots
Bobs Boots specializes in making rugged outdoor footwear. Bobs’ top management has
recently attended a workshop on ‘doing well by doing good.’ They decide to put what
they learned from the workshop into practice by investing in CSR that will contribute to
Bobs’ financial performance. Because Bobs has core capabilities related to designing and
manufacturing boots, they decide it makes strategic sense for Bobs to adopt the popular
“one-for-one” model of social impact according to which a firm gives away one of its
products for free to a person in need for every product it sells (Marquis & Park, 2014).
Bobs management hopes that this initiative will increase customer willingness to pay for
Bobs Boots, provide material for effective marketing campaigns to raise brand
awareness, increase motivation of Bobs employees, and improve Bobs’ reputation among
the general public.

After operating for several years, it becomes clear that Bobs’ one-for-one CSR initiative
contributes to Bobs’ strategic goals in the way management had hoped. However, it also
becomes clear that the initiative fails to make any meaningful social impact. Giving boots
to people in poverty turns out not to be an effective way of helping them. Some recipients
of boots from Bobs have pressing needs for food, medical supplies, or other basic
necessities, and they sell the boots for a fraction of their cost in order to raise money to
cover these expenses. For other recipients, though a new pair of boots makes them
marginally more comfortable, the boots have no impact on their wellbeing or their ability
to live dignified, minimally decent lives. There is little reason to judge that recipients of
boots from Bobs are meaningfully better off than they would have been had they never
received the boots at all. If Bobs were a charitable organization devoted to improving the
lives of the poor, its boot donation program would have been judged a waste and a
failure.

Suppose further that the lack of positive social impact of Bobs’ one-for-one program does
not come as a surprise for Bobs’ management team. They were aware of arguments for
why cash transfers are often much more effective means of alleviating poverty than
donations of goods (Blattman & Niehaus, 2014a). They were also familiar with evidence
indicating that a similar footwear donation program sponsored by TOMS Shoes had a
negligible overall effect on the lives of recipients (Wydick, Katz, Calvo, Gutierrez, &
Janet, 2016a). Indeed, at the time they granted final approval to go forward with the onefor-one boot donation initiative, Bobs’ upper management team did not expect that the
initiative would actually have any meaningful positive impact on the lives of its
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beneficiaries. But they decided that the likelihood that the initiative would boost the
firm’s financial performance constituted sufficient reason for Bobs to pursue it.

There seems to be something unethical about Bobs’ conduct. It may not be clear
yet why it is wrong—I offer my account of that in the next section. However, the idea that
it could be ethically acceptable for a firm to pour resources into a CSR initiative that has
no or very little meaningful social impact merely for the purpose of increasing its
financial performance rings false.
Notice how the Bobs Boots case does not quite fit as a poverty-alleviation
analogue of greenwashing or bluewashing. First, though Bobs Boots’ wrongful conduct
may be partly discursive to the extent that its marketing efforts rely on misleading public
statements about the social impact of its boot donation program, its wrongful conduct is
not exclusively or primarily discursive. Bobs’ overall conduct and presentation of its
product—not just its speech, narrowly construed—creates a misleading connection in the
minds of its stakeholders between its product and the cause of poverty alleviation.
Second, unlike paradigmatic cases of greenwashing and bluewashing, Bobs is not using
its CSR initiative to conceal other ethically dubious conduct from public scrutiny. It is
not as though Bobs chooses to donate pairs of boots to people living in poverty to distract
attention from some aspect of its business model that contributes to poverty. Aside from
its disingenuous CSR, Bobs does nothing wrong. The ethical problems with Bobs’ CSR
stem from it being disingenuous in the sense that it is undertaken with insufficient regard
for the end (in this case, poverty alleviation) that it purports to promote or protect.
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One might object at this point that there seems to be a significant difference
between some types of greenwashing, bluewashing, and window dressing that involve
concealing or distracting attention from harmful activity, on the one hand, and cases like
Bobs Boots, which does not involve underlying harmful activity, on the other. BP’s
conduct is in an important sense worse than the conduct of Bobs Boots because in
addition to being disingenuous, BP also inflicted (unjustified) harm on the environment
and various stakeholder groups.
I agree that BP’s conduct involved wrongs that Bobs’ conduct did not. However, I
maintain that we should understand the wrong involved in BP’s harmful conduct
separately from the wrong involved in greenwashing and disingenuous CSR. If the harms
BP inflicted on the environment and various stakeholder groups were indeed wrongful,
they would have also been wrongful absent BP’s Beyond Petroleum marketing campaign.
But it is the Beyond Petroleum marketing campaign, not the harms themselves, that make
BP’s conduct qualify as greenwashing. Thus, when firms use greenwashing to cover up
or distract attention from other harmful behaviors, we should understand the
greenwashing and the harmful behaviors as separate kinds of wrongs. As a result, despite
the additional wrong of inflicting harm present in the BP case that is absent from the
Bobs Boots case, the analogy between BP’s greenwashing and Bobs’ disingenuous CSR
holds up.
A final point of clarification: whether an act or tactic counts as disingenuous is
intent-sensitive. Someone who makes a genuine effort to convey the truth but fails is not
being disingenuous. Neither is a firm that makes a genuine effort to promote an ethical
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end through a CSR initiative but fails due to some unforeseen circumstance. Thus, in the
real world, where we often lack information about both individual and group intentions, it
is usually difficult to determine for certain whether a given act qualifies as disingenuous
or instead reflects the influence of bad luck or genuinely well-intentioned incompetence.
(This is one reason why I have chosen to rely on the fictional Bobs Boots example rather
than a real-world case for the purposes of my discussion.)

III. What’s wrong with disingenuous CSR?
Now that it is clear what disingenuous CSR is and how it works, I will discuss the
main reasons why it is unethical. One of my main claims in this paper is that we can
understand greenwashing, bluewashing, and window dressing as specific instances of the
more general category of disingenuous CSR. However, I do not believe that all
disingenuous CSR is unethical for the same reason, or even that all disingenuous CSR is
necessarily unethical—though, as the discussion that follows will suggest, most instances
of disingenuous CSR probably are unethical. Thus, what follows is a description of some
of the most important ways in which disingenuous CSR can be unethical.

a. Stakeholder trust and the market for CSR
A certain level of stakeholder trust (Pirson & Malhotra, 2008, 2011;
Schnackenberg & Tomlinson, 2016) is required for an individual firm to derive benefits
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from strategic CSR. If customers of the socially conscious footwear company TOMS
shoes did not trust that TOMS would deliver on its stated commitment to give away one
pair of shoes to a child in need for each pair sold, or if they learned the donated shoes
were of such poor quality that they fell apart after a few normal days of wear, then they
presumably would not be willing to pay more for TOMS Shoes than an otherwise
identical product with no CSR attribute. Without the trust of its customers, TOMS would
get no competitive advantage from its CSR program. An analogous effect would likely
hold for certain other stakeholder groups: employees, suppliers, shareholders, and so on.
The first thing to notice about firms that sell products with CSR attributes is that
their situation is analogous to the ‘lemons problem’ that Akerlof (1970) diagnosed for
used cars. Akerlof showed how the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers of
used cars creates an adverse selection problem in the used car market. As a result, highquality used cars fail to reach the market. There is an analogous information asymmetry
between firms and their CSR-valuing stakeholders. Generally, the firm will have much
more access than its stakeholders to information relevant to assessing the quality of its
CSR (Cho, Lee, & Pfeiffer Jr, 2013). After all, the firm will usually be responsible for
administering its CSR initiatives, while stakeholders have to gain information provided
by the media, third-party evaluators and standard-setting organizations, or, in many cases,
the firm itself. To be sure, some stakeholder groups (e.g. employees) may have more
access to information about CSR quality than others (e.g. customers), and information
about some CSR initiatives may be relatively accessible. But in many cases, stakeholders
have to rely chiefly on information from the firm’s own representations to assess quality
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of CSR. As a result, it will often be difficult for stakeholders to gather enough
information to determine whether a given CSR project is of high quality (a ‘peach,’ to use
Akerlof’s folksy term for high-quality used cars) or low quality (a ‘lemon’).
As Akerlof's (1970) analysis indicates, the likely effect of this situation is to
inhibit high-quality CSR from being offered in the market. Assume that stakeholders
make quality judgments about CSR: for an individual stakeholder, high-quality CSR
effectively promotes a cause that stakeholder cares about, while low-quality CSR doesn’t
promote a cause the stakeholder cares about or doesn’t promote its cause effectively.
When stakeholders have the information necessary to make quality judgments about
CSR, they will be willing to pay more for high-quality CSR than for low-quality CSR.
However, in reality, stakeholders are likely to have difficulty distinguishing high-quality
from low-quality CSR. As a result, they will not be willing to pay significantly more for
high rather than low quality. Thus, firms interested in offering high-quality CSR will
have difficulty obtaining a price premium for it. Assuming high-quality CSR requires
greater investment on the part of the firm than low-quality CSR, firms will have little
incentive to offer products with high-quality rather than low-quality CSR attributes. In
sum, because of information asymmetries between CSR ‘producers’ (i.e. firms) and
‘consumers’ (i.e. stakeholders who value CSR), potential producers of high-quality CSR
will be unable to enjoy strategic advantages of offering high-quality CSR on the market.
This is a market failure that will cause high-quality CSR to be under-provided.
The second thing to notice about the market for CSR is that, because of the
information asymmetry that gives rise to the lemons problem, stakeholder trust can be
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seen as a collective good (Olson, 2009) from the point of view of firms seeking to derive
strategic benefits from CSR. A given stakeholder’s level of trust in a transaction will
partially depend on features specific to an individual firm. Some firms have reputations
for honesty and fairness, and some do not. In many cases, at least some reputational
information is available. But in many cases, for many stakeholder groups, trust levels for
a transaction will depend also on reputational factors of groups of firms in a given
industry or region (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; King & Lenox, 2000; Tucker, 2008). Thus, for
many firms, the degree to which they can gain strategic benefits for CSR will depend not
just on the reputation they cultivate individually, and the resulting level of stakeholder
trust it elicits, but also on the overall level of trust various stakeholder groups have
toward the industries and regions in which the firm does business.
Stakeholder trust functions as a collective good in the following sense (see also
King, Lenox, & Barnett, 2002). As a group, firms seeking strategic advantage from CSR
will benefit from higher levels of stakeholder trust toward firms in their regions and
industries. When the level of stakeholder trust is high, stakeholders will give greater
credence to firms’ representations of the quality of their CSR projects. This will allow
firms with high-quality CSR to overcome the information asymmetries that plague the
market for CSR and successfully differentiate themselves from firms with low-quality
CSR. As a result, firms will be able to generate greater strategic benefits through their
CSR activities. The problem, however, is that it will be in the private interest of
individual firms to under-invest in CSR quality, portray their CSR initiatives as higher
quality than they actually are, and reap strategic benefits by free-riding off of the overall
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level of stakeholder trust and exploiting stakeholders’ lack of ability to distinguish
between different quality levels of CSR.
This analysis of the market for CSR allows us to identify two ways in which CSR
that is disingenuous but pursued out of strategic motivation risks countenancing unethical
behavior. The first is that, by exacerbating failures in the market for CSR, disingenuous
CSR both (a) contributes to the lemons problem dynamic by which high quality CSR is
inhibited from being sold on the market and (b) undermines the collective good of
stakeholder trust that facilitates firms having a strategic incentive to invest in CSR. As a
result, the CSR market will provide less CSR, and of lower quality, than it would if it
were not beset by these market failures. To the extent to which high-quality CSR is
ethically valuable, this is a consequence that agents have ethical reason to avoid.
The second way that disingenuous CSR is likely to result in unethical behavior
concerns fairness. Again, when a firm engages in disingenuous CSR, but does so
strategically by publicly representing its CSR as high quality, it free-rides on the
stakeholder trust to which other firms have contributed through honesty, fair dealing, and
other trust-generating behaviors. By doing disingenuous CSR strategically, the firm gains
the benefits from shareholder trust generated by firms that avoid disingenuous CSR, as
well as the individual strategic benefits of stakeholders’ perception that it is doing CSR
(Tosi & Warmke, 2016).
Disingenuous CSR, then, leads both to bad consequences in the form of lower
levels and quality of CSR, and to unfair free-riding on the collective good of stakeholder
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trust generated by firms that do not engage in disingenuous CSR (on the latter, see
Cullity, 1995).

b. Disrespect and manipulation
According to Strudler (2005: 459), it is “a sufficient even though not exhaustive
characterization of manipulation that one person manipulates another when he
intentionally causes that person to behave as he wishes through a chain of events that has
the desired effect only because the manipulated person is unaware of that chain.” For
example, in Shakespeare’s Othello, Iago manipulates Othello when he places
Desdemona’s handkerchief in Cassio’s possession, causing Othello to adopt the false
belief that Desdemona has been unfaithful to him (Noggle, 1996). Othello acts on this
belief by murdering Desdemona in a fit of rage. Iago intentionally causes Othello to kill
Desdemona in order to achieve the desired effect of destroying the lives of Othello and
Desdemona. His scheme only works because Othello is unaware of the manipulation—
had Othello known that Desdemona’s handkerchief came into Cassio’s possession
because Iago planted it there, not because Desdemona had been unfaithful, Othello would
not have slain his innocent wife.
Disingenuous CSR is likely to be manipulative in this sense to many stakeholders
who are induced by the firm’s CSR to transact with the firm. Imagine Alex, a socially
conscious boot collector who decides to buy her boots from Bobs rather than a rival boot
maker in part because she has seen the publicity generated by Bobs’ one-for-one boot
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donation initiative. Alex believes that combatting global poverty is an important cause,
and she feels that she should support an organization that is stepping up and actually
doing something about it. From Bobs’ strategic point of view, their CSR investment has
had the desired effect of raising the willingness to pay for boots from Bobs of customers
like Alex.
But Bobs’ CSR will only have the desired effect of causing Alex’s willingness to
pay for boots from Bobs to increase if Alex does not know pertinent information about
Bobs’ CSR initiative: For instance, if Alex knew that Bobs’ CSR is disingenuous because
Bobs is concerned only with the strategic benefits it derives from its CSR and not with its
CSR’s actual social impact, she would be even less willing to purchase Bobs products
than she would have been had Bobs never established its CSR program at all. The reason
why Bobs’ CSR increases some consumers’ willingness to pay for Bobs products is
because those consumers care about the plight of the global poor. By harnessing that
caring for its own private gain and failing to use its CSR activities to meaningfully
advance the cause of poverty alleviation in the way a stakeholder like Alex would
legitimately expect, Bobs manipulates those stakeholders. This kind of manipulation is
unethical because, among other reasons, it is inconsistent with the requirement of Kantian
moral respect for persons to always treat others as ends in themselves (Arnold & Bowie,
2003; Kant, 2002).

c. Moral licensing
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Psychologists have identified a phenomenon called moral self-licensing whereby
an individual’s performance of a deed he believes is ethically good can increase his
propensity to subsequently engage in conduct he believes to be unethical (Merritt, Effron,
& Monin, 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001). Some studies on moral self-licensing suggest
that CSR may interact with this psychological phenomenon in ethically troubling ways.
In their experimental study of the effect of green products on ethical behavior, Mazar &
Zhong (2010) find that participants who had purchased green products were less likely to
exhibit altruistic behavior than participants who had purchased conventional products. In
addition, List & Momeni (2017) conducted experiments that find a similar moral
licensing effect for employees of firms that engage in CSR: employees assigned to work
in CSR firms were about 24% more likely to cheat on subsequent tasks than employees
assigned to non-CSR firms.
This research suggests a worrisome unintended effect of CSR: in some contexts,
purchasing a product with CSR attributes or working at a firm that does CSR could make
consumers or employees more likely to engage in unethical behavior, or less likely to
engage in ethically good behavior, than they otherwise would be. If an individual’s moral
motivation or self-control are sensitive to how she perceives the ethical status of her
behavior in the recent past, then exposure to CSR may displace ethical conduct in other
areas of a person’s life.
Moral licensing raises a host of important empirical and normative questions that
I cannot resolve here. Empirically, we lack a detailed understanding of the explanatory
mechanisms by which moral licensing occurs (Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg,
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2015) and of how to render moral self-licensing effects compatible with evidence from
social psychology about “foot-in-the-door” and related effects whereby individuals are
driven to act in ways that are consistent with their past behavior (Freedman & Fraser,
1966; Mullen & Monin, 2016). Normatively, it is not clear to what extent individuals
bear ethical responsibility for licensing effects (on themselves and others) of their
behavior, or whether the permissibility of an act depends on its foreseeable licensing
effects. One view that strikes me as initially plausible, but that I lack the space to defend
here, would hold that it is permissible to displace ethical acts through moral licensing so
long as the displacing acts are ethically better than the acts that are displaced.
If this is right, it would explain why non-disingenuous, meritorious CSR might be
ethically permissible even if it has a licensing effect. It is one thing if a well-managed
CSR initiative that contributes effectively to an important cause licenses future unethical
behavior by stakeholders who interact with it. It is significantly more problematic if
disingenuous CSR that fails to contribute effectively to an important cause also licenses
those who interact with it to behave less ethically than they otherwise would. The more
common and the greater the magnitude of the moral self-licensing effect, the stronger the
ethical objection to strategic disingenuous CSR, which depletes stakeholders’ moral
motivation without effectively advancing a good cause so that the firm can increase its
competitive advantage. This is just the sort of socially destructive profit-seeking behavior
that socially responsible businesses must avoid.
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IV. How can CSR be unethical?
One of my main claims in this paper is that a certain category of CSR,
disingenuous CSR, is usually unethical. It might strike some readers as odd that a
category of CSR would be unethical. Is CSR not ethical by definition?
For the purposes of this paper, I have adopted the same definition of CSR that is
most prominent in management and CSR literature. CSR, on this understanding, refers to
activities that are undertaken voluntarily (rather in response to, e.g., a legal requirement)
and are intended to provide benefits or mitigate harms to stakeholders, society, or the
natural environment (Barnett, 2007a; Mackey et al., 2007; Marquis et al., 2007; Rupp et
al., 2006). The notion of organizational intention that this definition of CSR invokes,
however, is both under-theorized (it is not clear what constitutes organizational intention)
and difficult to measure (to the extent that organizational intention depends on
organizational leaders’ internal mental states, it cannot be observed directly). It is perhaps
for these reasons that definitions of CSR in the management literature often appeal to the
notions of appearance or reflection of intention or social purpose, rather than making
CSR ascription dependent on actual intention (e.g. Matten & Moon, 2008; McWilliams &
Siegel, 2001). And when CSR activity is used as a variable in empirical studies, it nearly
always treats the notion of intention as figurative rather than literal—CSR researchers do
not typically attempt to ascertain the actual motives of the CSR decision makers in the
firms they study in order to prove that they acted with the sort of intent that real CSR
requires. If it looks like CSR, it is taken to be CSR. Thus, in effect, we can understand
CSR to refer to activities that (1) appear to promote some apparently ethical or social
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purpose beyond firm financial performance or (2) appear to reflect a commitment on
behalf of the firm to that ethical or social purpose.
Notice that, if we adopt this standard conceptualization of CSR, then the fact that
an activity qualifies as CSR is no guarantee that that activity is ethical. After all, an
activity can appear to promote an ethical or social purpose without actually promoting
that ethical or social purpose. An activity can appear to reflect a commitment to an ethical
or social purpose on behalf of the firm that engages in it without the firm actually being
committed to that purpose. Appearances—and reflections—can be deceptive. Recall
Bobs Boots. It is easy to imagine stakeholders interacting with a firm like Bobs and
interpreting its boot donation initiative as a clear case of CSR. Yet, given the facts of the
case, despite qualifying as CSR, what Bobs does is unethical.
Of course, we are not compelled to adopt this common understanding of CSR. We
might define CSR in a way that conceptually guarantees that activity that counts as CSR
is also ethical. We could, for example, define CSR in terms of a firm’s actual fulfillment
of its social or ethical responsibilities. Now, determining precisely what a firm’s social or
ethical responsibilities are is difficult. This is the function of normative ethical theory.
Utilitarianism will imply that a given firm has a certain set of ethical responsibilities,
Kantian deontology will imply a somewhat different set, contractualism yet another set,
and so on. This is one drawback of tying CSR ascriptions to fulfillment of substantive
ethical and social responsibilities: it requires resolution of deeply controversial questions
of normative ethics in order to determine whether a given activity qualifies as CSR. (It is
easy to see why management scholars studying the antecedents and consequences of CSR
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activity have adopted a conception of CSR that does not require them to do this.) I do not
take a position on whether this conceptual drawback outweighs the conceptual advantage
of guaranteeing that activities that count as CSR are also ethical. My point is simply that,
given how CSR has been conceptualized, unethical CSR is both a conceptual and
empirical possibility.

V. Some reservations about strategic CSR
The idea that CSR can be strategically advantageous to a firm has become
prominent over the last several decades. There is a large literature that studies whether
greater levels of corporate social performance are associated with stronger or weaker firm
financial performance (e.g. Hawn & Ioannou, 2016; Turban & Greening, 1997; Waddock
& Graves, 1997). There is an even larger literature devoted to deepening our
understanding of whether and how particular kinds of CSR provide firms with strategic
advantages (e.g. Hart, 1995; Hart & Dowell, 2011; Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2014;
Jones, 1995; Porter & Kramer, 2002; Prahalad, 2006). In addition to its considerable
influence among academics, strategic CSR has become a common topic in business
school classrooms and has received considerable attention from practitioners (M. Porter
& Kramer, 2011; Werther Jr & Chandler, 2010).
I do not want to overstate the worries about strategic CSR that I present in this
section. I accept that it is generally a good thing for firms to take actions that constitute
win-wins for both the firm and society. Managers ought to think rigorously and creatively
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about how they can benefit society in ways that also contribute to their firms’ gaining and
sustaining competitive advantage. Academics ought to support this through both research
and teaching.
However, it is also easy for strategic CSR to be taken too far. If ethics is equated
with CSR—as I just argued, it should not be; nevertheless, it often is—then strategic CSR
can mislead managers into thinking that considerations of ethics and social responsibility
can be reduced to familiar financial performance metrics. Extreme versions of strategic
CSR thus risk countenancing greenwashing, bluewashing, window dressing, and other
forms of disingenuous CSR. Some of the most prominent strategic CSR scholarship
encourages this way of thinking. It does not just urge managers to search for
opportunities to do CSR that will also contribute to gaining and sustaining competitive
advantage, but further argues that managers ought to base their decisions about CSR
primarily or exclusively on strategic considerations.
The clearest articulation of the view that CSR ought to be reduced to strategic
considerations comes from a seminal article on strategic CSR by McWilliams & Siegel.
They suggest that their strategic CSR approach “enables managers to determine the
appropriate level of CSR investment” (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001: 118). A firm’s “ideal
level of CSR can be determined by cost-benefit analysis,” because the firm that invests in
a profit-maximizing level of CSR “meets the demands of relevant stakeholders—both
those that demand CSR (consumers, employees, community) and those that ‘own’ the
firm (shareholders) (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001: 125). In the conclusion of the
‘managerial implications’ section of their paper, they declare, “In sum, managers should
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treat decisions regarding CSR precisely as they treat all investment decisions”
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001: 125), i.e. as ordinary business decisions to be pursued or
avoided based on their expected contribution to the firm’s bottom-line financial
performance.
Endorsements of this extreme version of strategic CSR appear elsewhere as well.
Husted & Salazar (2006), whose argument I discuss in greater depth below, support a
similar position to that of McWilliams & Siegel. Siegel (2009: 5), in a practitioneroriented article about sustainable management practices, asserts “that firms should adopt
‘green management’ practices only if such activities complement the organization’s
business- and corporate-level strategies and ultimately enhance profitability or
shareholder wealth.” One can also find strategic CSR advocates who do not explicitly
avow versions as extreme as McWilliams & Siegel, but who nevertheless strongly
suggest that managers ought to think about CSR from a primarily strategic perspective.
Drucker (1984: 62) writes that “the proper ‘social responsibility’ of business is to… turn
a social problem into economic opportunities and economic benefit.” More recently, the
‘creating shared value’ approach that Porter & Kramer (2011: 76) have famously
advocated, which has become a fixture in business school classes, insists that managers
should eschew CSR that does not yield strategic benefits in favor of “policies and
operating practices that enhance the competitiveness of a company while simultaneously
advancing the economic and social conditions in the communities in which it operates.”
Again, although Drucker and Porter & Kramer do not clearly advocate a version of
strategic CSR as extreme as that of McWilliams & Siegel—to their credit, Porter &
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Kramer insist that CSR initiatives ought to solve social problems as well as contribute to
attainment of competitive advantage, meaning that they do not countenance behaviors
like greenwashing—they are at the very least prone to be interpreted as saying that CSR
decisions ought to be reduced to strategic considerations.
The problem with the aforementioned extreme versions of strategic CSR, as well
as the less-extreme-but-prone-to-misinterpretation versions, is that by reducing CSR to
strategic considerations (or tempting careless readers to do so), they risk countenancing
the greenwashing, bluewashing, and window dressing behaviors that I discussed earlier in
the paper. Thus, although they are presented using the language of social responsibility,
they encourage unethical behavior.

VI. The invisible hand defense of strategic CSR
One of the most famous justifications of market actors basing decisions upon their
individual private interest, rather than the public interest, comes from Adam Smith’s
Wealth of Nations. Because of how markets align individual incentives with the public
interest, even when market actors intend only to promote their own interest, they are “led
by an invisible hand to promote” the public interest as well (Smith, 1904: 456). An
advocate of an extreme version of strategic CSR might make a similar argument:
although the decision procedure upon which managers ought to rely when making
choices about CSR investments ultimately boils down to strategic considerations, the
outcome for society of individual firms pursuing strategic CSR will be beneficial since
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market pressures will induce profit-oriented firms to produce social benefits through their
CSR initiatives. Indeed, Husted & Salazar (2006) make essentially this argument in an
article advocating that firms pursue CSR out of strategic rather than altruistic motives.
Firms tend to respond to appeals to their strategic interest better than they respond to
appeals to corporate altruism. Thus, a “focus on corporate altruism would probably result
in a lower overall social output by the business community than a focus on social
strategy” (Husted & Salazar, 2006: 87).
This ‘invisible hand’ defense of strategic CSR fails for at least two reasons. First,
invisible hand arguments for the market only vindicate the profit-seeking orientation of
individual market actors in markets that at least roughly approximate conditions of
perfect competition (Heath, 2014; Jones & Felps, 2013). But as the previous section on
stakeholder trust and the CSR ‘lemons’ problem explains, there is at least one important
condition of perfect competition that does not even approximately hold in many markets
for CSR: that buyers have adequate information about products and prices to make sound
decisions, given their preferences. Because ‘buyers’ of CSR lack information about the
quality of CSR on the market, purely profit-seeking behavior on the part of firms that do
CSR is unlikely to induce market actors to produce socially desirable levels of various
types of CSR. Rather, individual firms’ purely strategic pursuit of CSR is likely to
exacerbate the ‘lemons’ problem in the market for CSR.
Second, invisible hand defenses of the market require that buyer preferences as
expressed in the market at least roughly approximate buyers’ actual preferences that we
have reason to care about from an ethical point of view (Buchanan, 1985; Cohen, 1977).
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If buyers make decisions in the market that do not advance their well-being—if they fail
to behave rationally—then the market will fail.
It is important to take a moment to understand, at least in rough terms, some of
the conditions that must obtain for an individual buyer’s market behavior to reflect the
preferences that might be thought to constitute her well-being. To start, the buyer must
have knowledge about what her preferences are. If she is buying a couch, for her choice
to reliably track her preferences, she must have engaged in at least minimal rational
deliberation about what she values in a couch—comfort, durability, size, aesthetic
qualities, and so on. Additionally, she must have invested in gathering a certain amount
of information about which of the various couches available on the market will best
satisfy these preferences.
For the invisible hand argument to apply to the market for couches, these two
conditions about individual buyers’ knowledge of their own preferences must at least
approximately obtain. But even if we assume these features about consumer preferences
generally hold for goods like couches, there is reason to expect that, in many cases, they
likely will not hold for consumer (and other stakeholder) preferences about CSR.
Judgments about the quality of a couch implicate fairly concrete practical questions:
whether it is comfortable, its durability, its aesthetic qualities, and so on. It seems
reasonable to suppose that individuals generally have a good idea of what makes a couch
good or bad for them, given their circumstances. But judgments about CSR quality
implicate more abstract issues about which people are likely to have less well-formed
opinions than their taste in couches: e.g. relative assessments about which causes deserve
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our attention and resources, what are the best means for advancing a given cause, and so
on. Thus, the willingness of a typical consumer to pay for a product with a CSR attribute
is likely to be much less responsive to the actual quality of the CSR than the typical
consumer’s willingness to pay for a couch is to the actual quality of the couch.
Additionally, the ethical relevance of individual consumer preferences for CSR is
less evident than for goods like couches. Couches are largely a matter of individual taste.
If Bob loves purple couches but Helga believes purple couches are ugly, the market can
provide Bob with purple couches and Helga with other colors, and Helga has no
legitimate grounds to object: assuming they do not share a living room, Bob’s choices
about couch color are none of Helga’s business. It is difficult to imagine a case in which
one would have a reasonable, serious objection to the market for couches providing
whatever consumers happen to prefer. But CSR is different. CSR decisions often
centrally implicate issues of ethics and justice in which we all have a stake.
Unlike for couches, we can imagine cases where one might reasonably and
seriously object to the CSR market providing whatever consumers happen to prefer.
Simler & Hanson (2017) argue that, in many areas of life, what people say they will do
and what they are actually motivated to do diverge, and that people’s actual motivations
are often more selfish than their stated motivations. Suppose that this divergence between
public presentation and private motivation frequently occurs when consumers purchase
products with CSR attributes. For example, when a consumer purchases a green product,
she mainly cares about signaling to others her concern for the environment rather than
actually using her role as a consumer to promote and protect important environmental
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causes. Her engagement in CSR is thus disingenuous in the way discussed above from
the perspective of the firm. Hence, this consumer’s preferences are fulfilled perfectly well
when the firm whose product she buys does CSR disingenuously, so long as this does not
undermine the positive signaling benefits of the CSR product purchase. Suppose that,
when the market provides attractively-marketed, disingenuous CSR, it is providing
precisely what many consumers really do want.
Even if this were the case, I maintain that we could still reasonably object to CSR
that is disingenuous and that fails to effectively promote or protect an important cause.
To be clear, my claim here is not that consumer preferences should be considered
irrelevant to CSR decision making. Rather, my contention is that the fact that the market
for CSR efficiently produces CSR that satisfies stakeholders’ preferences is not sufficient
for establishing that the resulting CSR initiatives are ones we would have reason to
endorse from an ethical perspective. Because of this, as well as the possibility that
stakeholder preferences for CSR may not be as fully developed as consumer preferences
for ordinary market goods and services, those who put forward the invisible hand defense
of strategic CSR need to show why stakeholders’ revealed preferences for CSR represent
preferences that have ethical significance. They also must demonstrate how the market
for CSR can overcome the information asymmetries that lead to the CSR lemons
problem. In the meantime, the claim that we can count on market mechanisms to induce
profit-oriented firms to undertake ethically desirable levels and forms of CSR should be
regarded with a healthy dose of skepticism.
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VII. Conclusion and further research
In this paper, I have sought to clarify the concepts of greenwashing, bluewashing,
and window dressing, while also directing our attention to a more general category of
unethical CSR activity, disingenuous CSR, that contains many practices that are unethical
for the same reasons greenwashing, bluewashing, and window dressing are unethical. As
I have argued, disingenuous CSR is typically unethical. This is an important finding in
light of the exhortations of some proponents of certain extreme versions of strategic CSR,
which countenance disingenuous CSR. By reducing CSR decision making to financial
performance considerations, and by understanding CSR in a way that is largely
disconnected from substantive ethical considerations, the range of CSR activities that
could be endorsed by a given firm on strategic grounds includes some conduct that is
typically unethical.
Indeed, if it is the case that disingenuous CSR is, as an empirical matter, a fairly
widespread phenomenon, then it is concerning that these extreme strategic CSR views
have as much influence as they do. In the frameworks that management and CSR
researchers promulgate in their more public works—such as textbooks, articles in popular
venues, popular books—great care ought to be taken to make clear that CSR cannot be
reduced to strategic considerations. As I have demonstrated, when managers undertake
CSR primarily for strategic reasons, they must ensure that they do so within the bounds
of certain constraints in order to avoid greenwashing, bluewashing, window dressing, and
disingenuous CSR behaviors more generally.
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My arguments suggest some moral constraints that strategic CSR initiatives must
respect in order to be ethically acceptable. I cannot give a full explanation of these here.
However, to conclude, I will briefly outline two important constraints that ethical
strategic CSR must respect. In the course of this discussion, I also flag several questions
for future research.

a. Worthiness and effectiveness
First, to be ethically acceptable, CSR must promote or protect a worthy cause. In
an episode of the American television show The Office, Michael Scott, the branch
manager, organizes a ‘fun run’ to raise money that will go toward raising awareness of
the dangers of rabies. Clearly, this is not a worthy cause. The merits of awareness-raising
campaigns are generally dubious—merely raising awareness often does little to advance a
cause. Plus, though rabies is a serious disease, it is not clear what we as a society should
do about it beyond what we are already doing. Effective rabies treatments exist, and
people rarely contract it. Thus, even if a firm were able to gain strategic benefits from a
CSR initiative devoted to an inconsequential cause such as raising awareness about the
dangers of rabies, it would be ethically wrong for the firm to do so.
Second, in addition to advancing a worthy cause, CSR must promote or protect
that cause at least minimally effectively. A good example of an ineffective attempt to
achieve social impact is PlayPumps, a charity that installs water pump merry-go-rounds
in some countries in Africa (MacAskill, 2015). The vision behind PlayPumps is that
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children would use the merry-go-round for amusement while at the same time pumping
much-needed clean water for their families. However, children find PlayPumps too tiring
to be suited for play. As a result, adults end up having to spin them to pump water.
Compared to the normal pumps they replaced, PlayPumps are more expensive, more
difficult to maintain, and pump less water (MacAskill, 2015). Providing clean water to
people who lack it may well be a worthy cause, but PlayPumps failed to promote it
minimally effectively and ended up making worse the lives of the very people they were
supposed to help. Even if a firm could gain strategic advantage from funding the
construction and distribution of PlayPumps—picture glossy marketing materials with
smiling children playing on a merry-go-round as crystalline water gushes forth—it would
be wrong for it to do so. Strategic CSR must promote or protect the cause to which it is
devoted at least minimally effectively.
I would suggest that a more developed account of these constraints would likely
forbid most (if not all) forms of greenwashing, bluewashing, window dressing, and
disingenuous CSR more generally. Clearly, though, there is much more to be said. I
confess that a ‘fun run’ for rabies and PlayPumps are easy cases. They avoid some
interesting, but challenging, questions that are raised when we attempt to determine
where these ethical lines are drawn. How do we compare the worthiness of causes, and
what is the minimal baseline of worthiness required for a cause to be the target of
permissible strategic CSR? In a world in which the global poor die from preventable
causes like malnutrition and curable disease, are common causes of corporate
philanthropy like promoting opera, ballet, or sports justifiable as worthy causes? Are
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managers obligated to pursue maximally effective means for promoting a worthy cause,
or is the effectiveness requirement less demanding than this? Such questions require
further theorizing about what makes a cause worthy and what level of effectiveness is
ethically required.
If CSR is important as the attention it garners indicates, if we want people to take
seriously the idea that CSR can change the world for the better and is not just a marketing
gimmick at best and a veil for corporate malfeasance at worst, then clarifying our
thinking about these questions is crucial.
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CHAPTER 2: An effective altruist approach to corporate social responsibility
I. Introduction
In Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith observes that “fitness, [the] happy
contrivance of any production of art, should often be more valued, than the very end for
which it was intended” (Smith, 1982). His point is that it can be tempting to value
attributes of the inner workings of machines over the ends whose furtherance is the
reason why the machine is useful in the first place. When the inner workings of machines
have aesthetic value, this may be perfectly appropriate. Smith gives the example of a man
who values his watch for its mechanical perfection rather than its utility for telling time.
Many people appreciate watches in this way. I see no reason to think their doing so is
mistaken.
However, there are clearly cases where valuing machines in this way would be
misguided. A watch that exhibits the highest virtues of fine craftsmanship, but is
unreliable for telling time, would be a poor choice for use in, for instance, laboratory
equipment that requires precise and accurate time measurements to function effectively.
It can be tempting for scholars of business organizations, as well as practitioners
who rely on business scholarship, to make an analogous sort of mistake when thinking
about corporate social responsibility (CSR). Many scholars take financial performance, or
something similar, to be the goal according to which business managers’ decisions should
be made and evaluated (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2002; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004).
Theories in the field of strategic management have proliferated to explain how firms can
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achieve the sustained competitive advantage that is typically required to achieve superior
financial performance (e.g. Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996; Porter, 2008). In particular, the
resource-based view of the firm, or RBV, has emerged as a paradigm within the field of
strategic management (e.g. Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). According to
the RBV, firms achieve sustained competitive advantage when they possess and control
valuable resources and capabilities that their rivals cannot easily replicate or approximate.
The RBV suggests a certain general logic for how managers should make decisions: in
brief, they should identify their firm’s valuable resources and capabilities, and make
decisions based on what will best protect and extend the competitive advantage that those
resources and capabilities generate (Grant, 1991). Thus, when deciding whether to
diversify or divest, managers should generally favor related diversification that leverages
resources and capabilities that the firm’s current activities leave idle, and divest from
lines of business that are unrelated to the firm’s main resources and capabilities (Neffke
& Henning, 2013).
When applied to CSR decisions, the RBV seems to imply that CSR should be
integrative: the CSR activities a firm undertakes should be closely linked to the firm’s
valuable capabilities or resources (Battilana, Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 2012; Dees &
Anderson, 2003; Marquis & Park, 2014; M. E. Porter & Kramer, 2011). However, using
the RBV as a source of prescriptive guidance for CSR decision making is problematic.
As a theory of strategic management, the main purpose of the RBV is to explain how
firms achieve superior financial performance. However, as I argue in the first essay in
this dissertation, improved financial purpose cannot serve as a plausible basis for CSR
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decision making. CSR decisions implicate ethical values that financial performance
metrics do not capture. Thus, to use the RBV as a source of guidance for how managers
should make decisions about CSR is to value the inner workings of business
organizations and institutions at the expense of the ends that those organizations and
institutions should promote. (Or, less charitably, it may reflect an excessive adherence to
a shareholder primacy ideology.) Unlike Smith’s watch aficionado, in the case of
business organizations and CSR, this focus on internal workings at the expense of
external function is highly problematic. If CSR is truly a way for business to change the
world for the better, rather than a marketing gimmick or a veil for corporate malfeasance,
then prescriptive guidance about CSR cannot come from theories of strategic
management or views about organization design derived therefrom. Rather, prescriptive
guidance about CSR needs to be based primarily on ethical considerations.
But which ethical considerations? After discussing the inadequacy of the RBV as
a basis for prescriptive guidance about CSR in section III, I introduce effective altruism, a
recent academic and social movement (Berkey, 2018; MacAskill, 2015; Singer, 2015), in
section IV as a potential ethical framework for CSR. In brief, effective altruism urges
people to use rigorous analysis and strong evidence to increase the amount of positive
impact they have through their altruistic acts. To apply these theories to a concrete
example of CSR, Section V discusses Toms Shoes’ widely-praised Buy-One Give-One
model for social impact. Toms being held up as a paradigm of CSR makes sense if we
take a financial performance approach to evaluating CSR, like the one represented by the
RBV, but not if we evaluate CSR using effective altruism.
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Although effective altruism provides much better tools for guiding and evaluating
CSR decisions than strategic management theories like the RBV, it is also, I argue, not
entirely adequate as a framework for CSR decision making. This is because CSR is not
just about beneficence, which is the focus of effective altruism. Some CSR reflects other
moral considerations. Thus, in section VI, I propose that we distinguish between three
categories of CSR: (1) beneficent CSR, which reflects moral reasons firms have to
promote the good of others; (2) preventative/restorative CSR, which reflect moral reasons
firms have to avoid committing harms and rights violations, and to make amends for and
compensate victims of past harms and rights violations; and (3) reciprocal CSR, which
reflects moral reasons firms have to foster and sustain reciprocal relationships. While
effective altruism is not a good framework for decisions about preventative/restorative
CSR and reciprocal CSR, I briefly show how the moral reasons underlying these
categories of CSR suggest the general form that prescriptive guidance about them should
take. Section VII concludes.

II. Financial performance-first versus ethics-first approaches to CSR
Moral philosophers commonly distinguish between moral reasons and prudential
reasons for action. Agents have prudential reasons to act in ways that promote their own
interests and goals. Agents have moral reasons to act in ways that morality commands or
recommends. The categories of prudential and moral reasons are not mutually exclusive.
Sometimes prudential and moral reasons overlap, recommending the same course of
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action, though sometimes they of course diverge. The prudential-moral reasons
distinction is useful for understanding the different kinds of normative considerations that
apply to individual moral agents.
Similarly, it is useful to make an analogous distinction between the reasons that
apply to business firms.1 The firm analogue of prudential reasons are reasons based on
financial performance considerations. When a manager chooses what action a firm should
take, her deliberations will usually implicate both financial performance reasons and
moral reasons. However, it is common to think about corporate decisions using what I
will call a “financial performance-first” framework. This is what defenders of shareholder
primacy advocate (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2002). Financial performance-first
frameworks can still allow a place for ethical considerations. Advocates of tinged
stockholder theory—which holds that managers should maximize profits within the
constraints of not only obligations of law, but also ethics (Heath, 2014; Langtry, 1994;
Norman, 2011)—are particularly explicit about this. But moral reasons are limited to a
constraining role in financial performance-first decision frameworks. They delimit how
the manager may pursue her firm’s financial performance-first goals. Moral reasons do

In this paper, I write about business firms as if they are moral agents. In doing so, I do not
intend to take a side in the debate over whether organizations qualify as moral agents in a
deep metaphysical sense (e.g. Pettit, 2007; Velasquez, 1983). Either we can understand firms
as literal moral agents, or we can understand talk of corporate moral agency as
metaphorical. In the latter case, writing of firms being subject to certain reasons for action is
shorthand for saying that the various individual human agents that act on behalf of a firm
are subject to those reasons for action. The position one takes in this debate does not affect
this paper’s main arguments, so I choose to remain neutral about it.
1
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not themselves constitute the main goals that serve as the basis of managerial decision
making.
Contrast financial performance-first frameworks with what I will call ethics-first
frameworks. In ethics-first decision frameworks, the goals that the decision maker seeks
to promote, and uses as a metric for comparing the desirability of alternative potential
courses of action, reflect the ethical reasons that apply to the decision maker. For
example, a decision maker who attempts to choose a course of action on the basis of a
moral theory—e.g. Kantianism, utilitarianism, virtue ethics, contractualism—employs an
ethics-first decision framework.
So long as the right ethical constraints are respected, financial performance-first
decision frameworks are appropriate for many business decisions. This is because actors
pursuing profit in well-functioning markets bring about important social benefits (such as
wealth, which I discuss in this dissertation’s third essay). There are some business
decisions for which a financial performance-first decision framework cannot be justified.
CSR, I claim, is one particular category of managerial decision that calls for an ethicsfirst, rather than financial performance-first, decision framework. Ethical reasons apply
much more directly to decisions involving CSR than ordinary, non-CSR business
decisions because CSR involves the appearance of promoting or being committed to
some social or ethical goal beyond firm financial performance (see, e.g., Barnett, 2007;
Mackey, Mackey, & Barney, 2007; Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007). Additionally, for
many (though not all) non-CSR business decisions, acting on the profit motive can be
ethically justified by appealing to Adam Smith’s invisible hand (Smith, 1776)
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explanation of how markets align the incentives of individual market actors with the
public interest. However, the invisible hand of market mechanisms cannot generally
vindicate the profit motive in the domain of CSR (as I argue in this dissertation’s first
essay).

III. A financial performance-first framework: The resource-based view
As the field of strategic management developed in the 1980’s and 90’s, the RBV
represented an important shift in emphasis from approaches such as Michael Porter's
(2008), which focus on how a firm’s positioning within its industry can create sustained
competitive advantage by generating market power for the firm in product markets. The
RBV, by contrast, focuses on how firms realize sustained competitive advantage from
firm-specific resources and imperfections in factor markets (Lehrer, 2001). In other
words, the RBV attributes the source of sustained competitive advantage to a firm’s
control of valuable, difficult-to imitate resources. These resources often take the form of
core competencies or capabilities that are difficult for competitors to duplicate because of
their complexity and dependency upon tacit knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 1982;
Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).
Whether a resource can generate sustained competitive advantage, according to
the RBV, depends on the extent to which it is valuable, non-substitutable, rare, and
difficult to replicate.
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A resource is valuable if it can potentially produce rents from a firm’s assets—i.e.
profits in excess of the assets’ opportunity costs. A resource will often be valuable
because it either increases what a firm’s customers are willing to pay for its
products or decreases the costs the firm bears to produce and sell its products
(Porter, 2008).
A resource is non-substitutable if it contributes to a firm capability that, in
addition to being valuable, is more costly to acquire using an alternative resource
(Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989).
A resource is rare if it is costly or difficult for a firm’s rivals to acquire, perhaps
because it is firm-specific—i.e. only valuable in a context that is specific to the
firm that uses it (Barney, 1991; Reed & DeFillippi, 1990).
A resource is difficult to replicate when there are epistemic barriers to
understanding its cause sufficiently for a firm to build the resource itself, perhaps
because it relies on knowledge that is tacit or socially complex (Barney, 1991;
Winter, 1997).

In other words, for a valuable resource to generate sustained competitive advantage, there
must be some barrier preventing other firms acquiring the resource, or acquiring a
reasonably close substitute resource, and competing away the economic rents it
generates. As Grant (1991) shows, the basic explanatory tenets of the RBV have
implications for how managers should make decisions aimed at achieving sustained
competitive advantage. In brief, managers are advised to (1) identify their firm’s main
resources and capabilities; (2) estimate their potential to generate sustained competitive
advantage (i.e. whether they are valuable, non-substitutable, rare, and difficult to
replicate); (3) estimate whether the firm can capture the wealth they generate; (4) choose
the strategy that best exploits the firm’s resources and capabilities given the opportunities
available to it; and (5) identify ways to protect and extend their positions of competitive
advantage (Grant, 1991). Broadly speaking, the RBV perspective encourages managers to
identify their firm’s valuable resources and capabilities and base their corporate and
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business strategies around what will best protect and exploit those resources and
capabilities (e.g. Barney, 1995; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Williams, 1992). Thus, when
deciding whether to diversify or divest, managers should generally favor related
diversification that leverages resources and capabilities that the firm’s current activities
leave idle, and divest from lines of business that are unrelated to the firm’s main
resources and capabilities (Neffke & Henning, 2013).
The resource-based view’s prominence in the field of strategic management has
made a deep imprint in the field of CSR. Perhaps the best known example of this is Porter
& Kramer's (2011) work on Creating Shared Value (CSV), which they propose as a new
paradigm for understanding how business can contribute to alleviating social problems
that should supplant CSR. One of the main features distinguishing CSV from CSR, as
Porter & Kramer conceive of them, is that CSV initiatives bear a close connection to a
firm’s core capabilities: “CSR programs… have only a limited connection to the
business…. In contrast, CSV… leverages the unique resources and expertise of the
company to create economic value by creating social value” (Porter & Kramer, 2011:
16).
Porter & Kramer’s work on CSV contains an especially clear link between the
general ideas of the resource-based view and prescriptive guidance for firms pursuing
CSR. But the suggestion that CSR activities ought to be closely linked to a firm’s core
business capabilities, activities, and strategies appears elsewhere as well. Scholars of
hybrid organizations, which combine non-profit and for-profit missions, argue that
managers should view “integration as the hybrid ideal,” meaning that “everything [a
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firm] does produces both social value and commercial revenue” (Battilana et al., 2012:
52). Advocates of integration claim that tightly integrating a social venture’s financial
and social goals facilitates strategic decisions that further both types of goals
simultaneously: reducing production costs while also reducing environmental impact
(Hart, 1997), catering to under-served customers who occupy the bottom of the global
economic pyramid while expanding the markets in which firms sell their products
(Prahalad, 2009), increasing the amount customers who value the sort of impact to which
the firm’s social mission is devoted are willing to pay (Dees & Anderson, 2003).

IV. An ethics-first framework: Effective Altruism
a. Moral theories
This section introduces an ethics-first framework for CSR decision making to
contrast with the RBV-based, financial performance-first framework I just explained. But
on what basis would one determine the prescriptive principles for such a framework? A
moral theory—e.g. utilitarianism, Kantianism, virtue ethics—might seem like a
promising place to start. Moral theories purport to be theories about what one should, in a
moral sense, do. However, moral theories suffer from a problem of abstraction (Hasnas,
2013). The concepts that underlie most ethical theories—Kant’s categorical imperative,
eudaimonia, the good (as employed by utilitarians and consequentialists)—are so abstract
that their more precise content is itself a matter of significant debate. Thus, deriving
prescriptive principles for CSR from the best-known moral theories would require
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making controversial decisions about which version one adopts before the theory has
been developed enough to generate actionable prescriptive principles. A valuable area for
future research would be to articulate how plausible versions of the main ethical theories
could provide actionable prescriptive principles for CSR decisions (of the sort the RBV
generates encouraging that CSR be integrative). But that is not the approach I adopt here.
Alternatively, one might look to the main theories of CSR or business ethics as
sources for an ethics-first framework for CSR. However, I do not think any of them are
up to the task. Instrumental theories of strategic CSR (e.g. Husted & Salazar, 2006;
McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), which focus on how CSR can improve a firm’s financial
performance, fail to provide a plausible guide to CSR decision making for reasons I
explain in this dissertation’s first essay. Normative stakeholder theory (Donaldson &
Preston, 1995) may yield insights about one category of CSR (I discuss this below), but
has not been theoretically developed enough to be a source of concrete practical
guidance. Integrative social contract theory (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994), in my view, is
best understood as a theory about how and whether firms operating in international
environments ought to adapt their practices to different cultures they inhabit. Thus, it is
most valuable for understanding how CSR practices should be adapted to local cultures in
which they take place, rather than for grounding a prescriptive framework for CSR more
generally. The former issue is an important one, but not my focus here.

b. Effective altruism
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I propose effective altruism as a better starting place than moral theories or
business ethics and CSR theories for developing an ethics-first framework for CSR
decisions. It is only a starting place: I alter it in some ways that, in my view, improve its
suitability for the CSR context.
What is effective altruism? Philosopher Will MacAskill writes that effective
altruism
is about asking, ‘How can I make the biggest difference I can?’ and using
evidence and careful reasoning to try to find an answer. It… consists of the honest
and impartial attempt to work out what’s best for the world, and a commitment to
do what’s best, whatever that turns out to be. (MacAskill, 2015: 211)

Effective altruism insists that our altruistic decisions should be informed by the best
available evidence about how to increase our social impact. It requires doing rigorous
comparative analysis of one’s available altruistic courses of action. Berkey (2018)
interprets effective altruism as containing four principles:
EA1: There are very strong moral reasons, grounded in fundamental values, for
the well off to direct significant resources to efforts to address important moral
issues (e.g. to alleviate the plight of the global poor).

EA2: These fundamental values include (but are not necessarily limited to)
impartially promoting increases in welfare, or quality of life, for individuals, and
the reasons provided by this value are at least fairly weighty.

EA3: There are strong reasons to prefer giving to efforts that will promote the
relevant values most efficiently.
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EA4: We should employ the best empirical research methods available in order to
determine, as best we can, which efforts promote those values most efficiently.

I suggest that we view effective altruism somewhat more broadly than Berkey
defines it here. If, as EA1 holds, the well-off have strong moral reasons to direct
significant resources to important moral causes, then it seems that at least some
successful corporations would have similarly strong reasons to devote resources to CSR.
I find it plausible that firms that enjoy significant sustained economic rents (beyond their
costs of capital), and thus (at least when they are not in rapid periods of expansion) have
slack resources, do indeed have strong reasons to direct a portion of these rents toward
effective measures directed at important moral causes. But I do not insist that one must
accept this in order to qualify as an effective altruist for my purposes. Indeed, according
to some presentations of effective altruist ideas, a commitment to giving effectively if one
chooses to give in the first place is more fundamental than a commitment to giving in the
first place (see Pummer, 2016). One could thus endorse an effective altruist approach to
CSR decisions in the way I envision despite not fully embracing EA1.
Note also that effective altruism is not an exhaustive theory of moral decision
making. As a prescriptive approach to CSR decision making, effective altruism requires
taking principles EA2, EA3, and EA4 seriously. A moderate effective altruist might
decide, in a given case, that some consideration not contained in EA2-4 has sufficient
importance to weigh against the importance of reasons contained within EA2-4. (E.g.
giving somewhat higher weight to the interests of members of the firm’s own community
when deciding upon which cause to select for its CSR program.) Of course, one does
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have to give EA2-4 a reasonably significant level of weight in one’s decision making for
CSR to properly qualify as effective altruist. But they need not be absolute.

c. Effective altruist CSR
The tenets of effective altruism are open to some interpretation. Effective altruists
try to increase the good they do through their altruistic acts, but what do they mean by
“good”? Principle EA2 leaves the definition of “good” somewhat open, specifying that it
includes promoting increases in welfare. But there are many different potential theories
of welfare (e.g. Arneson, 2000; Harrison & Wicks, 2013; Jones et al., 2016). Different
versions or interpretations of effective altruism will adopt different understandings of
what “the good” is. Some effective altruists suggest following health economists’ lead
and adopting Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) as a metric for comparing the
amounts of good done in alternative potential courses of altruistic action (MacAskill,
2015). These allow researchers to estimate the benefit of a health or charitable
intervention in a way that weights years of extended longevity according to their
quality—comfortable, enjoyable years get more weight than painful, miserable ones.
No plausible decision procedure can be reduced to a number. We must therefore
guard against viewing any single metric as an all-encompassing gauge of an initiative’s
social impact—i.e. the good that it accomplishes. But metrics are also indispensable for
gathering information necessary for making informed comparative judgments between
alternative potential courses of action. To take impact seriously in the way effective
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altruism requires, we must base our decisions upon the best available evidence, and
evidence often takes the form of metrics.
The effective altruist organization GiveWell attempts to put effective altruist
principles into practice by curating a list of the most effective charities in the global
poverty cause area. Their analysis is not value neutral, of course—it relies on decisions
about how to weigh its various health, wellbeing, and economic indicators when doing
comparative effectiveness evaluations of its recommended charities (see “Approaches to
Moral Weights: How GiveWell Compares to Other Actors,” 2017). However, the
analysis is useful, because it identifies some specific charities that GiveWell’s rigorous
effective altruist analysis suggests are especially effective at saving and improving
human lives. GiveWell’s 2019 list of recommended charities (“GiveWell List of Top
Charities,” 2019) includes:
•
•

•
•

Two organizations devoted to anti-malaria initiatives in sub-Saharan
Africa, Malaria Consortium and Against Malaria Foundation;
Four organizations that support deworming programs in low-income
countries, Evidence Action’s Deworm the World Initiative,
Schistosomiasis Control Initiative, Sightsavers, and END Fund;
Helen Keller International, which provides vitamin supplements to reduce
child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa; and
Give Directly, which runs direct cash transfer programs targeting very
poor people in Kenya and Uganda.

Examining GiveWell’s top charities list makes clear some implications of effective
altruist principles. A marginal dollar is much more valuable to a poor person than a
wealthier (even if poor by some absolute standard) person. Thus, resources are generally
much more effectively spent targeting problems of the world’s poorest people. This is
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why all of the recommended charities target extremely poor members of some of the
world’s poorest societies. Additionally, resources are more effectively spent on extremely
harmful problems that can be alleviated relatively cheaply than on less harmful problems
or problems that are more costly to alleviate. This explains why nearly all recommended
charities (Give Directly is the exception) focus on basic health and medical problems.
Some global health issues that reduce significant years (e.g. malaria) and quality (e.g.
tropical parasites) from people’s lives can be reduced and alleviated through strongly
evidence-supported measures. Funding is the main bottleneck limiting how much of an
impact these organizations are able to have. Thus, marginal dollars donated to these
organizations contribute significantly to improving human welfare by averting deaths and
increasing the wealth and income of some of the world’s poorest people.
Effective altruism is a framework for thinking about CSR, not an algorithm. As I
have indicated, effective altruists could weight principles of effective altruism and
principles exterior to effective altruism differently and thus come to different decisions
about how CSR ought to be pursued in a given case. What is required is a commitment to
seriously considering which causes are the most important, and which means can address
them most effectively, when choosing how to implement CSR initiatives.

d. The Easy Baseline Principle
Though I refrain from discussing too many details about implementing effective
altruist thinking in CSR decision making, it is worth discussing one concrete prescriptive
51

effective altruist principle for evaluating and making decisions about CSR. This shows
how effective altruist CSR would likely differ compared to other approaches to CSR
decision making.
Direct cash transfers represent one of the simplest forms of charity. Donors
simply give money to recipients. There is also strong evidence that cash transfers, like the
ones managed by the GiveWell-recommended charity GiveDirectly, are among the most
effective ways of significantly improving the lives of some of the world’s least well off
(Kapur, Mukhopadhyay, & Subramanian, 2008; MacAskill, 2015). Research shows that
cash transfers have significant, long-term, positive effects on recipients’ income: one
study found that, five years after receiving cash grants, men in Sri Lanka enjoyed annual
incomes between 64% and 96% greater than the original grant amount (De Mel,
McKenzie, & Woodruff, 2012). Other research shows that cash grants can have large
positive impacts on children’s health (Gertler, 2004). Despite fears that poor recipients of
cash grants will waste their money on gambling, alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs,
studies have failed to find a positive correlation between receiving cash transfers and
spending on these sorts of goods (Haushofer & Shapiro, 2013). Studies also have largely
failed to confirm the related fear that cash transfers will reduce recipients’ motivation to
work: indeed, cash transfers often increase working hours by allowing recipients to move
to places with better jobs (Blattman, Fiala, & Martinez, 2013).
Direct cash transfers, then, are a highly effective and simple way of making a
large social impact. Thanks to organizations like Give Directly, anyone, including any
firm, with resources to spare for charitable causes can do a huge amount of good by
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giving to organizations that effectively facilitate direct cash transfers to the very poor.
The simplicity, accessibility, and effectiveness with which organizations like Give
Directly promote an indisputably important cause—contributing to alleviation of severe
poverty by giving poor families the resources they need to raise themselves out of their
penury—makes direct cash transfer charities a good fit for their role in what I will call the
Easy Baseline Principle. As a heuristic, it will be useful to have an effective altruist
baseline against which to weigh potential CSR initiatives. Any such baseline will be
somewhat arbitrary by necessity. But fixing one is useful enough that we should do so
anyway.
Easy Baseline Principle2: (1) The default form of CSR for an effective altruist
firm should be donating to Give Directly or a similarly effective cash transfer
charity; (2) a good reason is necessary to justify deviating from the Easy Baseline.

(1) is both easy to fulfil and extremely restrictive. It is easy to fill because any firm (or
individual) with resources to donate is capable of fulfilling it. It is restrictive because it
sets an extremely high bar for effectiveness.
It seems unlikely that many actually-existing activities that we would generally
take to qualify as CSR3 could fulfil it, given how effectively direct cash transfers promote
This principle is inspired by an article by Benjamin Todd, the founder of the effective
altruist organization 80000 Hours: https://80000hours.org/2015/12/whats-the-easiest-wayanyone-can-have-a-big-social-impact/
3 For the purposes of this paper, I adopt a definition of CSR that is common in the
management literature (Barnett, 2007a; Mackey, Mackey, & Barney, 2007; Marquis, Glynn,
& Davis, 2007; Rupp, Ganapathi, Aguilera, & Williams, 2006). CSR refers to activities that
are undertaken voluntarily (rather than in response to, e.g., a legal requirement) and appear
to promote an apparently ethical or social purpose beyond firm financial performance or (2)
2
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an undeniably worthy cause. Most real world donative CSR programs would not fulfil it;
certainly not giving away shoes, as Toms famously does. Non-donative forms of CSR are
even more hopeless when compared to this baseline. Consider CSR that takes the form of
a firm treating its employees fairly and generously, as Costco has gained a reputation for
doing. Consider CSR that takes the form of atoning for some past ethical transgression,
such as Starbucks closing its stores for a day of racial bias training following its April
2018 incident (more on these below). It appears difficult for an effective altruist manager
to justify doing any of these, or countless similar CSR examples, rather than the Easy
Baseline Principle’s default. This appears extreme. It might make effective altruism seem
less appealing, even to those who agree that, as a general matter, we have reason to do
things that contribute to bringing about more good and a greater social impact rather than
less.
This objection contains an important kernel of truth, but also does not provide
persuasive reason for rejecting effective altruism as a plausible, well-justified approach to
making and evaluating CSR decisions. In brief, my response to the objection is that, to
construct an ethics-first framework for CSR decision making, we must distinguish
between three importantly different categories of CSR: (1) preventative and restorative
CSR, (2) beneficent CSR, and (3) reciprocal CSR. I argue that effective altruism provides
a plausible framework for beneficent CSR, but not the other categories of CSR. However,

appear to reflect a commitment on behalf of the firm to that ethical or social purpose (see the
first essay of this dissertation).
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before discussing that, it will help to tie together the above discussion of effective
altruism and the RBV with a case.

V. TOMS Shoes as a CSR exemplar
Some examples of CSR become canonized in popular and academic writing, as
well as business school classrooms. One business model that has gained significant buzz
in this area is the Buy-One Give-One model most famously associated with the shoe
company Toms and the eyewear company Warby Parker. Firms that employ the Buy-One
Give-One model typically make a donation for each commercial sale. Toms shoes, for
example, gives away one shoe to a child in need for each shoe it sells.
It should be clear, from the discussion in the previous two sections, that Toms
Shoes makes a good deal of sense from an RBV-derived, performance-first framework
for CSR decision making. Marquis & Park (2014) explain how Toms serves as a
paradigmatic example of an integrative approach to CSR on the grounds that it links
some of its core capabilities—relating to the design and manufacture of shoes—to the
means by which Toms has its social impact. This creates a convergence between Toms’
social goals and its economic goals. For example, improvements in its shoe design can
result in both a better product that customers are willing to purchase at a higher price and
a more functional item for recipients of donated shoes. The connection between Toms’
social impact and a customer’s decision to buy a pair of Toms shoes is both clear and
simple, making it well-suited for an effective marketing message. To the extent to which
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the capabilities underlying Toms’ competitive advantage are difficult for competitors to
build, acquire, or substitute for, the RBV considerations underlying the strategy-first
framework might help companies like Toms achieve and sustain competitive advantage. I
dispute, of course, whether this factor possesses much relevance to ethical decisions.
Toms’ Buy-One Give-One program for shoes appears much more dubious when
we examine it using an ethics-first framework. Effective altruists will generally applaud
Toms’ goal of improving the condition of children in need. However, they will question
the means Toms employs to achieve that goal. Toms’ shoe donation program has in fact
been the subject of rigorous academic study, and the results were not promising.
Wydick, Katz, Calvo, Gutierrez, & Janet (2016) randomly assigned communities
in El Salvador to either treatment groups, in which children received shoes from Toms, or
control groups that did not receive shoe donations. Several months after the shoes were
donated to the children in treatment group communities, the authors failed to find
statistically significant differences between treatment and control groups even for
reductions in shoelessness. The authors similarly found no evidence that the shoe
donation program had any effect on overall health, foot health, or self-esteem, though
they did find that boys who received donated shoes had slightly better school attendance
records than boys who did not receive donated shoes (Wydick et al., 2016b). Of course,
this is just one study, and it is possible that other studies in different contexts would find
a greater impact. However, given the strong evidence supporting direct cash transfers as a
relatively effective way of making a social impact (Blattman & Niehaus, 2014b), this
troubling evidence about Toms suggests that, if we care about the potential of CSR to
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make a positive social impact, rather than just contribute to improved firm financial
performance, we should not embrace the Buy-One Give-One model as an exemplary
model of CSR and social enterprise without seriously scrutinizing the impact of specific
Buy-One Give-One programs.
My purpose here is not to vilify Toms. People, and organizations, make mistakes.
Indeed, I believe that Toms deserves great credit for funding and supporting Wydick et
al. (2016) study, despite its results seriously calling into question the program that put
Toms on the map as a social enterprise in the first place. This suggests that Toms’
management is not engaging in CSR disingenuously (see ch. 1 of this dissertation), but
actually takes CSR seriously from the perspective of making a social impact. I believe we
must all take the social impact of CSR similarly seriously, making and evaluating CSR
decisions using an ethics-first framework, like effective altruism, rather than a financial
performance-first framework, like the RBV. This could significantly increase the amount
of good accomplished through firms’ CSR activities, and lead to business doing a better
job of contributing to making society better off and the world a better place, rather than
just exploiting society and the world for the benefit of its shareholders (Jones et al., 2016;
Jones & Felps, 2013).

VI. Effective altruism and CSR: some qualifications
The most committed effective altruist would likely hold that all CSR decisions
should be based primarily or exclusively upon effective altruist principles, and that if this
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rules out common but not maximally effective ways of doing CSR—e.g. Costco’s
fairness and generosity toward its employees, Starbucks shutting down all of its stores for
a day to implement racial bias training—then effective altruism requires that firms cease
doing those forms of CSR.
As indicated above, I disagree with this more radical effective altruist approach to
CSR. Although I strongly believe that effective altruist ideas and principles are in many
cases vital for understanding how CSR decisions should be made, I also believe that they
are generally only directly pertinent to what I will call beneficent CSR: CSR whose
primary purpose is to do good or make the world overall a better place. But beneficent
CSR is not the only category of CSR. There are at least two other important categories of
CSR: preventative and restorative CSR (which, for reasons I explain below, I combine
into a single category), and reciprocal CSR. The primary purpose of preventative and
restorative CSR is preventing harms and rights violations, or compensating and atoning
for past harms and rights violations. The primary purpose of reciprocal CSR is to
establish and respect relations of reciprocity.
I do not use the term “primary purpose” to refer to the subjective goals of the
decision makers who carry out CSR. Rather, I use the term to refer to the (objective)
normative reasons for action that apply to a given situation, reflecting what an ethical
actor should do in that situation (Alvarez, 2016). A proper understanding of the
normative reasons for action underlying the various categories of CSR I identify will, as I
show, provide more specific guidance about how CSR decisions within each category
should be made and evaluated.
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A proper understanding of the normative reasons for action underlying the
categories of CSR will also be necessary for making sound decisions between the
categories. For example, a firm may face a choice of whether to devote its CSR resources
to preventative, reciprocal, or beneficent CSR. If devoting the resources to preventative
CSR is necessary to keep the firm from committing a serious harm or rights violation, the
firm will likely be morally obligated to use the resources on an effective preventative
CSR initiative, given the moral gravity of committing serious harms or rights violations.
Alternatively, there may be cases where beneficent CSR is morally required, e.g. when a
firm has a unique capacity to rescue victims from a moral catastrophe (Dunfee, 2006).
Ethical reasons must inform decisions about how to do CSR both within and between the
three categories.

a. Preventative and restorative CSR
In April of 2018, Starbucks found itself at the center of a scandal after a viral
video showed police, who had been called by a Starbucks store manager, arrested two
black men in a Philadelphia Starbucks who video showed waiting peacefully at a table for
a friend to arrive. The video exemplified the persistent racial inequities, especially those
connected to the criminal justice system, that have plagued the U.S. throughout its
history. Starbucks was perceived as complicit in perpetuating racial injustices due to its
store manager’s decision to call the police even though the two men who were arrested
did not seem to be acting inappropriately, and certainly were not acting inappropriately
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enough to justify involving the police. In the wake of the incident, the CEO of Starbucks
issued a public apology to the two victims of the incident. Starbucks also closed 8000 of
its U.S. locations for one day to implement racial bias training (Adams, 2018).
Any resources Starbucks spent on its public apology and racial bias training
almost certainly fall short of the test suggested in the Easy Baseline Principle by bringing
about significantly less good than simply donating to an effective direct cash transfer
charity. Does this mean Starbucks made the wrong decision when it decided to undertake
these CSR activities?
In my view, not necessarily. Starbucks, assuming it qualifies as a moral agent, has
moral reasons to refrain from committing serious harms or rights violations (Mill, 1978;
Nozick, 1974). These are weighty moral reasons—refraining from seriously harming or
violating the rights of others represents one of the most basic kinds of moral obligations
we, as moral agents, generally take ourselves to have. Firms thus can have strong moral
reasons to invest in preventative CSR—CSR whose justifying purpose is the avoidance of
serious harms and rights violations. An agent who has committed harms or rights
violations in the past can face similarly strong moral reasons to compensate and atone for
its past wrongdoing. Firms can thus face strong moral reasons to invest in restorative
CSR—CSR whose justifying purpose is to atone for, and compensate victims of, a firm’s
past wrongful acts.
The prevention of harms and rights violations involves deontic moral reasons
(Nagel, 1986). Preventative and restorative CSR are thus sensitive to the identity of the
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firm carrying out the CSR (as well as the identify of potential or actual victims of the
firm’s past wrongs) in a way that beneficent CSR is not. The Starbucks example provides
an intuitive illustration of this difference. The purpose of Starbucks’ racial bias training
was to prevent further racist incidents in Starbucks’ own stores, perpetrated by Starbucks’
own employees, rather than to prevent further racist incidents in general. Starbucks’
apology only made sense given a relational understanding of Starbucks’ wrongful
conduct: Starbucks making amends for its past wrongful act against the two men who
were arrested (Radzik, 2004). Starbucks, because of its identity, history, and relationship
with the two men who were arrested in its Philadelphia store, has a special reason to
make amends to those men that does not apply to, say, Dunkin’ Donuts or Tim Hortons.
Effective altruists evaluate potential actions mainly using effectiveness criteria.
Given the amount of resources required, how much good would be produced by selecting
course of action A versus the alternatives of B or C? To be sure, effectiveness
considerations still bear some relevance to preventative and restorative CSR decisions.
For racial bias training to be appropriately responsive to the moral reasons that applied to
Starbucks, the training must be effective. Minimally, this requires using best practices
based on the best available evidence about how to reduce racial bias. Reducing racial bias
is a difficult task. In a recent meta-analysis of research on procedures that change racial
bias, Forscher et al. (2016: 2) find that, although some procedures have a small effect on
measures of implicit racial bias, these procedures “changed explicit measures less
consistently and to a smaller degree than implicit measures and generally produced trivial
changes in behavior.” Even when anti-racial bias procedures have a measurable effect on
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some kinds of individual racial bias, “those changes do not necessarily translate into
changes in explicit measures or behavior” (Forscher et al., 2016). There is even a danger
that racial bias training can inadvertently promote racial stereotyping and cause people to
act in ways that reflect greater racial bias (Duguid & Thomas-Hunt, 2015).
Taking effectiveness seriously is necessary in order to take appropriate action in
response to the moral reasons underlying preventative and restorative CSR. But the
relevance of effectiveness is limited. Suppose a manager must choose between three
alternative courses of CSR action, A, B, and C. A involves taking measures necessary to
prevent the manager’s firm from causing severe harms or rights violations (or,
alternatively, A involves taking measures necessary to atone for past wrongs the firm has
committed and compensate the victims of those wrongs). Assume B and C are, by
relevant measures, more effective than A: they bring about a greater amount of good
relative to the resource investments they require. But the effectiveness of B and C comes
at the cost of failing to prevent harms or rights violations (or failing to atone for and
compensate victims of past wrongs). Absent unusual circumstances, a firm engaged in
preventative or restorative CSR cannot justify doing B or C rather than A, even if B and
C are more effective.
This discussion goes to show that preventative and restorative CSR reflect moral
reasons the fulfillment of which depends on factors that differ from the main moral
considerations of effective altruism. Prescriptive guidance for preventative and
restorative CSR requires looking elsewhere. For preventative CSR, research on human
rights (Beitz & Goodin, 2009; Caney, 2010), as well as the associated duties of
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businesses (Arnold, 2010; Wettstein, 2012), will be relevant, though preventative CSR of
course applies in local and national contexts, as well as the international contexts that are
usually the focus of human rights discussions. Restorative CSR requires understanding
what must be done to atone for past wrongs and what duties are owed to victims of past
wrongs. Academic research relevant for developing a prescriptive framework for
restorative CSR includes literature on reconciliation (Griswold, 2007; Radzik & Murphy,
2015) and corrective justice theory (Coleman, Hershovitz, & Mendlow, 2015; Weinrib,
2012).

b. Reciprocal CSR
Costco has developed a reputation for CSR thanks in large part to its famously
generous labor practices (Cascio, 2006a) (which are often compared favorably to the
stingy labor practices associated with Walmart’s Sam’s Club, Costco’s main rival).
Costco pays its employees a high hourly wage and provides generous health care and
retirement benefits (Cascio, 2006b). Clearly, Costco employees benefit from these
policies, at least compared to less-generous alternatives. But Costco benefits as well,
because these employment practices are an integral part of Costco’s overall human
resources strategy, which depends on securing a loyal, productive workforce with low
turnover rates (Cascio, 2006a).
As with preventative and restitutive CSR, effective altruism seems ill-suited as a
framework for making good reciprocal CSR decisions. To be sure, effectiveness matters
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for reciprocal CSR. In Costco’s case, doing reciprocal CSR well requires understanding
what Costco employees value and successfully providing them with employment policies
and benefits that match what they value. But effectiveness is not among the main
considerations that should be used to choose between different potential courses of
reciprocal CSR action. Costco’s generous employment policies likely fall short of the
standard in the Easy Baseline Principle. Any resources Costco spends on its employees
would almost certainly do more good if they were donated to an effective direct cash
transfer charity. But although Costco may have reasons of beneficence to do what would
be best from an impartial point of view, these reasons do not necessarily outweigh its
reasons to return benefits to the partners with whom it shares reciprocal relationships, or
its reasons to foster reciprocal relationships in the first place.
To understand the moral reasons underlying reciprocal CSR requires a basic
understanding of reciprocity. Reciprocity refers to the idea that when one party A benefits
from interacting or relating with another party B, it is at least a good thing for A to return
some of that benefit to B (Schmidtz, 2006). This understanding of reciprocity illustrates
how the relationship between Costco and its employees is a reciprocal one: Costco
benefits its employees significantly more than it would if it treated its workforce more
opportunistically, and in turn Costco’s employees contribute to Costco’s bottom line
significantly more than if they treated Costco more opportunistically (Jones, 1995;
Williamson, 1979). Thus, reciprocal CSR principally involves (1) properly returning
some of the benefits derived from ongoing reciprocal relationships and (2) seeking out
opportunities to develop new reciprocal relationships.
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Of the three categories of CSR I discuss, reciprocal CSR is by far the most
theorized in business and management literature. This may be a reflection of the fact that
reciprocal CSR can easily be assimilated into the dominant logic that business decisions
ought to be justifiable in terms of bottom-line financial performance.
For example, instrumental stakeholder theory essentially elaborates how
reciprocal relationships between a firm and its stakeholders can function as a source of
competitive advantage (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995).
Creating Shared Value, “defined as policies and operating practices that enhance the
competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic and social
conditions in the communities in which it operates” (Porter & Kramer, 2011: 66), is
nearly definitionally equivalent to reciprocal CSR (de los Reyes Jr, Scholz, & Smith,
2017). Bottom of the Pyramid strategies are rooted in the idea of reciprocity, urging
managers and entrepreneurs to search for competitive advantage in yet-to-be developed
markets by designing products aimed specifically at meeting the needs of consumers at
the bottom of the global wealth pyramid (Prahalad, 2006).
The above perspectives are all valuable (at least to varying degrees). For business
to realize its full potential to promote the interests of stakeholders and society, managers
must think seriously, rigorously, and creatively about how to find and foster reciprocal
relationships for their firms. Scholarship that contributes to our understanding of these
reciprocal relationships—improving our understanding of how they work, which factors
contribute to their failure or success, how we should locate them in our overall theoretical
conceptualization of business and CSR—is valuable. However, as my categorization of
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CSR demonstrates, we must be careful about equating reciprocal CSR with CSR more
generally. We must be particularly careful not to allow the ideology of shareholder
primacy to blind us to the fact that there are other domains of CSR that cannot be
understood through the lens of mutual benefit. A related observation: we must not assume
that a firm that only does reciprocal CSR is fulfilling all of its ethical and social
obligations. (More on this below.) These truths can be obscured when advocates of
reciprocal CSR endorse positions like the following: “Creating shared value (CSV)
should supersede corporate social responsibility (CSR) in guiding the investments of
companies in their communities” (Porter & Kramer, 2011: 76). Reciprocal CSR is
important and worthy of attention. But there are other important categories of CSR as
well, and they cannot plausibly be reduced to considerations of mutual benefit.

c. Beneficent CSR
I have argued that effective altruism does not serve as an adequate basis for an
overall framework for CSR decision making because some categories of CSR—what I
have called preventative/restorative CSR and reciprocal CSR—are backed by moral
reasons against engaging in, and failing to make proper amends for, serious harms and
rights violations, and by moral reasons in favor of returning benefit to those with whom
one shares reciprocal relationships. Understanding the moral reasons that underlie the
different categories of CSR gives us a basic picture of how CSR decisions within (and
between) the categories should be made and evaluated.
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Unlike preventative/restorative CSR and reciprocal CSR, effective altruism does
provide a plausible basis for making and evaluating beneficent CSR decisions. Effective
altruism, as I have explained it, urges use of the best available evidence and analysis to
increase the beneficial impact one has through one’s altruistic actions. Beneficence refers
to actions, norms, and dispositions whose goal is to promote the good of other people (or,
arguably, sentient beings more generally) (Beauchamp, 2019). Thus, effective altruism
highlights the same underlying moral reasons as those favoring beneficent action.
Admittedly, the claim that effective altruism provides plausible guidance for
beneficent actions is somewhat controversial. But I want to argue that it is not as
controversial as some might think. Effective altruism as an approach to beneficent action
is controversial because it involves at least a minimal amount of moral aggregation.
When choosing between alternative courses of beneficent action, effective altruism tells
us to estimate how much good is accomplished by each alternative, and to choose the
alternative that (holding costs constant) produces the most good. We must assume that we
can intelligibly compare the amount of good that each potential course of action
accomplishes. But some moral philosophers deny this (Taurek, 1977; Wiggins, 1998).
Beneficence, according to these philosophers, is not about producing as much good as
possible. Instead, the “beneficent person is one who helps X, or rescues Y, or promotes
this or that cause and does so because each of those thing[s] is in its own way an
important and benevolent end” (Wiggins, 1998: 274).
I want to highlight some unattractive features of such radical anti-aggregation
views of beneficence. First, they have some highly counter-intuitive implications. Our
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intuitions about the extent to which numbers should count in our moral judgments may be
somewhat hazy when we are faced with various versions of, for instance, the famous
trolley problem dilemma, where one must choose between saving/killing an individual
versus saving/killing a group of several people (Foot, 1967). But they become clearer
with larger numbers. Suppose a trolley is driving toward a trip wire that, if activated, will
trigger a series of nuclear explosions that will kill nearly all of the 7 billion human beings
who inhabit the earth. You stand at a switch. If you pull the switch, it will divert the
trolley onto a track with one unlucky innocent person strapped across it. This person will
die if the switch is pulled. (Suppose that this person somehow would be spared from the
ensuing nuclear apocalypse if the trolley hit the trip wire.) It seems clear to me that the
right thing to do in such a case would be to pull the switch. The explanation for why this
is the right thing to do is also clear: morally speaking, the numbers count. (They may not
be determinative, but they do count.) Radical anti-aggregationists will bite the bullet and
insist that, because the numbers do not count, the person at the switch should not divert
the trolley, or should decide whether to divert on the basis of some fair procedure (e.g.
rolling dice) that gives the unlucky innocent person a chance at being spared. This, in my
view, is a significant bullet to bite.
Second, radical anti-aggregationist views fail to provide plausible guidance for
beneficent actions. There are many potential ways for a person or firm to be beneficent.
One might be beneficent by volunteering at one’s local food bank, helping Habitat for
Humanity construct affordable houses, donating money to an anti-poverty charity, and so
on. Radical anti-aggregationists would have us believe that we generally lack a rational
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basis for choosing one of these beneficent acts over another. But that does not seem right.
Medical professionals working in disaster areas or war zones often must engage in triage
to ensure that their limited resources go to the most pressing causes. Doctors and nurses
try to avoid treating mild coughs at the expense of treating heart attacks, and avoid using
all of their time and resources treating a single person while many untreated others suffer
or die around them (MacAskill, 2015). Do we really want to say that medical
professionals’ in such cases lack a rational basis for their decisions? Do we really want to
say that there is no way of making normative distinctions between available courses of
beneficent action? Again, some will happily bite this bullet and respond in the
affirmative. I, on the other hand, take these implications to cast significant doubt upon
radical non-aggregationist moral theories.
Acceptance of moral aggregation is generally associated with consequentialist
moral theories. It may thus be tempting to associate an effective altruist approach with
moral consequentialism. However, I believe it is a mistake to equate effective altruism
with moral consequentialism, especially given the overall view that I offer in this paper.
First, consequentialism is typically a theory of morality in general: roughly, an act is right
if and only if it brings about the best possible consequences. But the view I advocate here
limits the proper domain of effective altruism to that of beneficent action. One reason to
reject consequentialism is that it famously cannot account for deontic constraints such as
those generated by moral rights. Consequentialists struggle to explain why it would be
wrong for a doctor to abduct the postal worker delivering packages to the hospital and
then kill him so that his organs can be distributed to five patients who otherwise would
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die. But this sort of case does not pose a problem for the view I am advocating. Firms
have obligations of preventative CSR not to seriously harm others or violate their rights.
Serious harms and rights violations are prohibited even in cases where violating rights
would allow one to do more good. Effective altruist principles are straightforwardly
applicable only for choosing between beneficent acts, not for making moral decisions that
hinge upon moral considerations other than beneficence.
Effective altruism encourages us to make a serious effort to do more good through
our beneficent acts. The most influential versions of consequentialism, to once again put
it in somewhat rough terms, demand that we devote all of our acts to doing the most good
possible. There is an important difference between these stances. The former could, as I
have tried to argue, be a plausible view even to those who do not harbor a deep
commitment to consequentialism. Skeptics of consequentialism primarily criticize the
latter sort of view, not the former. It would be a mistake to equate the two views and
understand effective altruism to involve much more radical moral commitments than it
actually does.
Return now to the case of Toms Shoes and its Buy-One Give-One model for
beneficent CSR. The Easy Baseline Principle, the tenets of effective altruism more
generally, and the empirical evidence about the social impact of giving away footwear to
children in need should cause us to reject Toms footwear initiative as an exemplar of
beneficent CSR. The evidence is overwhelmingly strong that Toms could have done
significantly more to help the global poor if it had simply donated a portion of its profits
to an effective direct cash transfer charity instead of giving away footwear. Business
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scholars should not continue to encourage relatively ineffective forms of beneficent CSR
by continuing to play up the dubious success of Toms.

VII. Conclusion
CSR refers to a broad category of corporate activity. It is thus not surprising that a
plausible framework for making and evaluating CSR decisions cannot be reduced to a
single ethical principle, consideration, or theoretical perspective. I have tried to show that
it is nevertheless possible to specify several ethical considerations that seem especially
pertinent to CSR decisions: refraining from serious harms and rights violations,
reconciliation for past wrongful acts, reciprocity, and beneficence. Normative theory
about CSR can make further progress by clarifying our understanding of how the moral
reasons arising from each of the above considerations interact: in which cases do reasons
from one of these moral considerations outweigh or exclude reasons from the others?
Future research can also contribute to normative theory about CSR by shedding further
light on how decisions within the CSR categories I introduce should be made and
evaluated. Finally, normative theory about CSR would potentially benefit from
consideration of ethical perspectives and factors that my account does not consider. CSR
is difficult to understand from a normative point of view, and this paper is obviously not
the last word on the subject. It is clear, however, that normative research on CSR requires
engagement with normative ethical theoretical perspectives; financial performancefocused management theories such as the RBV cannot serve as the primary basis for
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prescriptive guidance about CSR (see Donaldson, 2012). Understanding the normative
aspects of the social responsibilities of business firms requires grappling with normative
ethics.
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CHAPTER 3: Against Paretianism: A wealth creation approach to business ethics
I. Introduction

Debate in the field of business ethics has historically centered around the question
of whose interests ought to receive priority in managerial decision making. Advocates of
shareholder primacy, such as Friedman (1970) and Jensen (2002), argue that the interest
of shareholders ought to be prioritized over those of other corporate constituency groups.
Advocates of stakeholder theory, most notably R. Edward Freeman, argue that managers
ought to weight the interests of non-shareholder constituency groups, such as customers,
suppliers, and employees, at least as much as the interests of shareholders (Freeman,
Harrison, Wicks, Parmar, & De Colle, 2010).
Although this debate about corporate purpose was (and remains) an important
one, it diverted the field’s attention away from adjacent questions of equal theoretical and
practical importance. One of these questions is: setting aside the issue of who the
beneficiary of a firm’s profits ought to be, how can we distinguish between ethical and
unethical ways of pursuing profit in a market? After all, nobody—not even the most
dyed-in-the-wool shareholder primacist—believes that firms should profit by murdering
and pillaging. There must be some ethical constraints on how firms may seek profit. But
what are they? Surprisingly little work in twentieth-century business ethics addressed this
question in a systematic way (McMahon, 1981 is an important exception; see also
Moriarty, 2019).
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This started to change shortly after the turn of the millennium, when Joseph Heath
began to develop his Market Failures Approach to business ethics (which I will refer to as
the MFA) (Heath, 2004, 2006). In my view, one of Heath’s most valuable contributions
to the field has been his success at getting business ethics scholars focused on the
previously-neglected question of how to differentiate between ethical and unethical
tactics for pursuing profit. His work has produced a burgeoning literature that addresses
this under-theorized topic (Heath, 2014; Jaworski, 2014; Norman, 2011; Singer, 2018;
von Kriegstein, 2016).
Heath deserves great credit for getting business ethics to focus on an important,
neglected question. However, as I will argue in this paper, Heath’s own answer to this
question, which is contained in the MFA, is unsatisfactory. I am not the first to criticize
the MFA: scholars have advanced external critiques of Heath’s work, objecting to the
MFA’s narrow focus on economic efficiency and its neglect of other seemingly important
ethical values (Hsieh, 2017; Martin, 2013; Silver, 2016; Singer, 2018).
My critique of the MFA, however, differs from many existing ones because it is
internal, rather than external. I argue that the MFA fails on its own terms to provide a
plausible, clear answer to the important question Heath raises of how we should
distinguish between permissible and impermissible (or, to use Heath’s terms, preferred
and non-preferred) tactics for pursuing profit in a market. In recent work, Heath has
helpfully clarified that the MFA should be understood as Paretian: it identifies the ‘point’
of economic market institutions to be the achievement of Pareto efficiency, and uses this
to justify restrictions on how market actors may seek profit (Heath, 2013, 2014). I argue,
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however, that Heath’s emphasis on Pareto efficiency is misguided. Pareto efficiency
cannot explain our basic intuitions about which sorts of profit-seeking tactics are
permissible or impermissible, and it does not provide plausible guidance about the
permissibility of tactics about which intuitions fail to provide clear judgment.
The paper does not just advance a negative criticism of the MFA. It also offers a
solution (or at least the beginnings of one) to the problems it highlights. I propose that it
is not Pareto efficiency, but rather the creation of wealth, that we should look to in order
to understand some basic constraints on how market actors may pursue profit. My claim
is not that wealth is the single unifying value that can explain everything about the ethics
of business and markets—I am skeptical that any such value exists. Still, wealth is a
significant value for business and market ethics, and it plays a large role in our
understanding of the ethical constraints on pursuit of profit in market contexts. I defend a
practical Wealth Creation Principle, which holds that firms may not employ combinations
of strategic tactics that appropriate more wealth than they create on net. The upshot of the
principle is that market actors should seek profit by engaging in productive, rather than
unproductive or destructive, entrepreneurial activities (Baumol, 1996).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II differentiates between Easy Cases
(where intuition provides clear, plausible answers) and Hard Cases (where intuition fails
to yield clear, plausible answers) concerning tactics for pursuing profit in the market. A
good theory should cohere with our intuitions about Easy Cases (or, if it diverges with
our intuition, provide compelling reason for why our intuition should be revised) and help
us think through Hard Cases where our intuitions give out. Section III presents the MFA,
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and identifies a principle that the MFA provides for distinguishing between ethical and
unethical (or preferred/non-preferred) tactics. I call this the Perfect Competition
Principle. Section IV argues that the Perfect Competition Principle is inadequate because
it has implausible implications about Easy Cases and fails to illuminate Hard Cases. It
also explains more generally why the MFA goes astray by placing so much emphasis on
Pareto efficiency: this notion cannot explain the desirability of competitive tactics that
disrupt the equilibrating processes of the market. I invoke rival conceptions of
entrepreneurship from Joseph Schumpeter and Israel Kirzner to help illustrate this point.
Section V explains my positive proposal, which is to replace Pareto efficiency with
wealth creation as a guiding value for market competition. I tentatively propose a
conception of wealth based on the Kaldor-Hicks standard from economics, as well as a
Wealth Creation principle that places a strong ethical presumption against the use of
profit-seeking tactics that appropriate more wealth than they create on net. Section VI
argues why, despite reservations of skeptics such as Dworkin (1980) and Jones & Felps
(2013), we should view wealth creation as ethically important, especially in the domain
of business ethics. I argue that we have ethical reason as a society to pursue greater
wealth because increased wealth constitutes increased positive freedom. Section VII
concludes.

II. Ethical constraints on pursuing profit in a market
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Consider the following tactics that market actors might employ in pursuit of
profit. I will refer to these as Easy Cases because we generally have clear, plausible,
intuitive judgments about their permissibility. These judgments may not be completely
ironclad, but we would need to be provided with strong reasons to seriously consider
revising them, given their intuitive plausibility. To borrow a metaphor from Quine &
Ullian (1978), they are closer to the center than the periphery of our web of ethical
beliefs.
a) A firm invests in new manufacturing technology that lowers costs by improving
production efficiency.
b) A firm redesigns one of its products in order to improve quality and increase
customer willingness to pay.
c) A firm attempts to tacitly collude with its competitors by sending signals that it
will follow its rival’s lead setting prices in various local markets.
d) A firm attempts to deter entry into the market through a form of contrived
deterrence: it seeks profit by investing in excess manufacturing capacity—beyond
the manufacturing capacity it would build if it were simply trying to invest up to
the point at which marginal cost equals marginal revenue—with the goal of
credibly threatening to flood the market with products and drive down price in the
event of entry.
Intuitively, both (a) and (b) are desirable: from the perspective of society overall,
businesses competing with each other by improving production efficiency or product
quality represent instances of the market working as it should, and of market actors
behaving as they should. Equally intuitively, (c) and (d) are not desirable: from the
perspective of society overall, businesses competing with each other through tacit
collusion or contrived deterrence represent instances of the market failing to work as it
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should, and of market actors behaving poorly. We can arrive at these judgments without
the aid of an elaborate theory. Intuition gets us most of the way there.
Some cases, however, are not so easy. Call them Hard Cases. Consider:
Small Town Stores
Suppose a chain of stores specializes in a category of products that is generally not
available in physical stores in small towns. This chain’s management perceives that there
is an untapped market opportunity in relatively small towns for the kind of stores in
which it specializes—perhaps rival firms in the industry have wrongly judged that towns
below a certain size couldn’t support this type of store, given the minimal scale required
to run the store efficiently. Management thus decides to quickly expand into small towns,
rapidly opening locations in all towns it judges to be promising locations. This tactic pays
off handsomely: there had been significant unmet demand for physical stores selling this
category of products in these towns. In addition to being viable businesses in small town
locations, these stores turn out to be sources of sustained competitive advantage for the
chain precisely because of geographic features of their small-town locations: most of the
towns only have enough population to support one store (which must be relatively large
due to scale efficiencies). The chain’s stores thus enjoy an advantageous competitive
position due to a barrier to entry: their first-mover and incumbency advantages, combined
with the towns only being able to support one store, makes building competitor stores an
unattractive investment for the chain’s rivals. The reduced competitive pressure resulting
from the barrier to entry allows the chain to charge somewhat higher prices for its
products than it charges in more competitive environments. It appears that the chain will
reap enormous profit margins from these locations for the indefinite future.

How should we understand the ethical responsibilities of firms that occupy
favorable competitive market positions such as this? On the one hand, it might seem that
above-normal returns are the just rewards for a firm that has successfully out-competed
rivals to occupy an attractive market position. It is not the fault of the chain in Small
Town Stores that some of the factors contributing to the barrier to entry shielding it from
competition—scale efficiencies, the small towns’ relative geographic isolation—are
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present. Indeed, the chain deserves some credit for having been the first among its rivals
to identify the business opportunity that these small-town locations offered. Plus, the
general social and economic effects of its move are (let us assume) positive, and its
customers shop there because they correctly perceive that the store offers products at a
good value that make their lives better. These factors indicate that the profit motive in
this case is doing precisely what we would want it to do.
On the other hand, it also seems that there must be some limits on how firms in
competitively advantageous positions are permitted to protect those positions and exploit
them for profit. One justification for the practice of setting prices at a profit-maximizing
level in competitive markets is that if other producers are capable of supplying an
equivalent product for a better value, then customers are free to switch. But this
justification is not available (or is at least deprived of some of its force) in cases like
Small Town Stores. The barriers to entry impede the competitive market forces that bring
about conditions in which consumers can easily defect to rival sellers in response to
excessive price increases.
For these Hard Cases in which our intuitions fail to provide clear guidance, it
would be helpful to have theoretical principles to aid us in identifying ethically salient
considerations. Thus, to summarize, two important desiderata for an adequate theory of
constraints on pursuing profit are (1) coherence with (or persuasive justification of
deviations from) basic intuitions regarding Easy Cases, and (2) plausible guidance for our
ethical judgments about Hard Cases.

79

III. The Market Failures Approach to business ethics
Joseph Heath presents his Market Failures Approach to business ethics (Heath,
2014) as providing just the sorts of principles that it seems we would need for
understanding constraints on pursuing profit in a market. Heath introduces the terms
preferred and non-preferred strategies to refer to the specific constraints on ethical
pursuit of profit that the Market Failures Approach provides. “Under conditions of
‘perfect competition,’” he writes, “lower price, improved quality and product innovation
would be the only way that firms could compete with one another. We can refer to these
as the set of preferred competitive strategies” (Heath, 2006: 549). However, because
markets in the real world at best approximate and frequently depart significantly from the
conditions of perfect competition (e.g. many buyers and sellers, homogeneous goods,
perfect access to information), “firms are often able to make a profit using non-preferred
competitive strategies, such as producing pollution, or selling products with hidden
quality defects” (Heath, 2006: 550).
The question, then, becomes: what principle or set of principles does the Market
Failures Approach (MFA) provide that can help us understand more specifically and
precisely which sorts of tactics for pursuing profit are among the preferred, and which are
among the non-preferred?
One interpretation of the above quoted passage from Heath is that lower price,
improved quality, and product innovation are the only preferred tactics (I use the term
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‘tactic’ where Heath uses ‘strategy’). But that seems unduly restrictive. Does Heath
believe that firms are prohibited from competing with each other by hiring away each
other’s employees or developing more efficient production technologies? Presumably
not. Hence, it is best to understand lower price, improved quality, and product innovation
as examples of preferred tactics, but not as exhaustive of the complete set of preferred
tactics. Therefore, to understand how the MFA distinguishes between preferred and nonpreferred tactics, we will need to look elsewhere.

a. Pareto improvement
In recent refinements of his work on business ethics, Heath has insisted that his
approach should be understood as “Paretian” (Heath, 2013: 50, 2014: 5). Heath
sometimes even appears to suggest that what is Paretian about his approach is that it is
built upon the principle of Pareto improvement: “the principle that, whenever it is
possible to improve at least one person’s condition without worsening anyone else’s, it is
better to do so than not” (Heath, 2014: 9–10). To avoid confusion, however, it is
important to understand that Heath himself explicitly rejects Pareto improvement as the
standard that market actors’ actions must meet in order to be judged desirable or
permissible according to the MFA. He is clearly right to do so—requiring that market
actors’ actions meet a Pareto improvement standard would render impermissible conduct
that is clearly desirable, like a firm lowering its prices in order to compete away
customers from rival firms. (When successful, price competition of this sort will make a
81

firm’s rivals worse off and thus fail to qualify as Pareto improving.) Whatever is the
principle the MFA uses to distinguish preferred from non-preferred tactics for pursuing
profits, then, it cannot be Pareto improvement.

b. Pareto efficiency
A state is Pareto efficient (or Pareto optimal) if nobody can be made better off
without making someone else worse off. Pareto efficiency is thus related to Pareto
improvement in the following way: a state is Pareto efficient if and only if it contains no
potential Pareto improvements.
Heath (2014: 5) claims that “the market is essentially a staged competition,
designed to promote Pareto efficiency.” Heath relies on the first fundamental theorem of
welfare economics to illustrate how we can distinguish between preferred and nonpreferred tactics for pursuing profit (Heath, 2014: 29). The first fundamental theorem
proves that, under conditions of perfect competition (i.e. market actors are price takers,
there is perfect information, markets are complete, property rights are perfectly defined
and enforced, and so on), any competitive market equilibrium is Pareto efficient (Arrow
& Debreu, 1954; Blaug, 2007). This allows us to see that, under “conditions of perfect
competition, lower price, improved quality, and product innovation would be the only
way that firms could compete with one another. We can refer to these as the set of
preferred competitive strategies” (Heath, 2006: 549). Heath appears to endorse what I
will call the perfect competition principle:
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Perfect competition principle: A strategic tactic is preferred if and only if
it is possible for a market actor to employ under conditions of perfect
competition, and non-preferred if and only if it is not possible for a market
actor to employ under conditions of perfect competition.

Two examples of non-preferred tactics that Heath offers, producing pollution and selling
products with hidden quality defects (Heath, 2006: 550), support this way of
understanding the MFA. The conditions of perfect competition make it impossible for
market actors to pursue profit by selling products with hidden quality defects because the
condition that all market participants have perfect information (including about product
features relevant to quality evaluations) preclude sellers from duping buyers in this way.
Similarly, the conditions of perfect competition make it impossible for market actors to
pursue profit by polluting—at least polluting beyond the level where the marginal social
cost of pollution is greater than the marginal social benefit. Perfect competition relies on
an idealized conception of property rights that are perfectly defined and enforced, and
that grant a property owner the ability to prevent other actors from behaving in ways that
negatively affect the use-value of their property. If burning a fire on my land causes
smoke to reduce the quality of the air above your land, then under perfect competition,
you can prevent me from burning fires without your assent. I, the polluter, would thus
have to bargain with you, and others who suffer negative effects from my pollution, until
a mutually agreed upon price on pollution is reached. This makes it impossible to profit
by polluting more than the socially optimal amount.
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Because of complications arising from the “theory of the second best” (Lipsey &
Lancaster, 1956), it is not clear whether the tactics the perfect competition principle
judges preferred/non-preferred also ought to be judged permissible/impermissible (Heath,
2004; Steinberg, 2017). However, my main point is distinct from second-best
complications. Hence, I will set them aside and assume that preferred is equivalent to
permissible, and non-preferred equivalent to impermissible. Ignoring second-best
complications, then, the perfect competition principle appears to be just the sort of
theoretical device we need to account for our intuitions about preferred/permissible and
non-preferred/impermissible tactics in Easy Cases and to help us think through Hard
Cases. As I will show, however, this appearance is deceiving: the perfect competition
principle fails in an important way to fulfil either of these desiderata.

IV. Why the perfect competition principle must be rejected
Product quality improvement is an Easy Case. It clearly must be judged
preferred/permissible. When firms compete with each other by making products that
better meet consumer needs, they are obviously pursuing profit in a way we as a society
want them to. Heath agrees, and he even insists that product quality improvement, along
with lowering prices and product innovation, are the only preferred strategic tactics
(Heath, 2006: 549). However, the judgment that product quality improvement is a
preferred tactic contradicts the perfect competition principle.
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a. Implications of the perfect competition principle
Perfect competition requires that there be (infinitely) many buyers and sellers
exchanging homogeneous goods. These conditions preclude individual market actors
from having any degree of market power, i.e. power to set the prices of the goods they
buy and sell. Suppose that these and the other conditions of perfect competition all
obtain. A firm, call it F, producing a homogeneous good discovers a way to produce a
higher quality version of the good. F begins selling this improved version of the good at a
price that will cause some customers to defect from F’s rivals to buy F’s new, higher
quality product.
The conditions of perfect competition are so restrictive that it is difficult to see
how this product quality improvement strategy could be possible to pursue when they
obtain. Recall that information under perfect competition is costless. This will enable F’s
rivals to copy the improvement instantaneously and underbid F if F prices the improved
good any higher than the price that will prevail when the perfectly competitive market
reaches equilibrium (where price is equal to marginal cost of production, and economic
profit is zero). It is thus not clear how competing on product quality is possible under the
conditions of perfect competition in a way that non-preferred tactics are not. This makes
it difficult to see how the perfect competition principle, which requires us to conduct
thought experiments about which tactics would be possible for a firm to pursue under
conditions of perfect competition, can illustrate the difference between preferred and nonpreferred tactics in the way Heath seems to envision.
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One might attempt to object to this point by arguing that there is an understanding
of ‘possibility’ in the perfect competition principle that avoids this problem. For example,
there is a sense in which market actors under conditions of perfect competition may try to
profit from product quality improvement. The relentless tendency of perfectly
competitive markets to move toward Pareto-efficient equilibrium renders this effort
futile, but market actors can still attempt it.
Contrast this with attempting to shift costs from pollution onto third parties. This
tactic appears to more inherently involve a violation of one of the conditions of perfect
competition than competing on property quality, given that it entails a violation of
property rights. One condition of perfect competition is that property rights are perfectly
defined and enforced. This means that, in the world of competition, one person cannot
impose costs of pollution on another in the way they often can in the real world. If I
dispose of my trash by dumping it in my neighbor’s pristinely manicured yard, I have
avoided the cost of trash disposal by imposing it on my neighbor. Clearly, I have violated
my neighbor’s property rights by doing this—my neighbor can no longer benefit from the
use of her yard in the way she was able to when it was in its former pristine state.
Moreover, there is a clear analogy between this case and other standard pollution cases.
Imagine if my neighbor depended on a stream flowing downhill from my land to hers for
drinking and watering her farm animals, and I dumped pollution into the stream that
made the water unsuitable for my neighbor’s purposes. Imagine if a factory on my land
emitted smoke that blew to my neighbor’s land, befouling the air that she and her farm
animals breathed. These polluting activities all involve violations of property rights.
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Thus, under conditions of perfect competition, they are not possible. Perhaps this points
to a way of distinguishing employing tactics that involve pollution from tactics involving
product quality improvements.
However, the conditions of perfect competition do not actually preclude the
possibility of attempting to profit from shifting costs of pollution onto third parties in the
way proposed above. What the conditions require is that polluters may not impose costs
upon third parties without compensating them. The costs and benefits of pollution are
thus allocated in the same way the costs and benefits of any product or good are
allocated: through a competitive bidding process between buyers and sellers. Properly
understood, then, the perfect competition principle forbids polluting beyond the level at
which one would pollute if the total social costs of pollution (rather than just the private
costs borne by the polluter) were factored into the polluter’s decision about how much to
pollute. There is a sense in which a polluter could attempt to pollute at a level beyond the
amount a perfectly competitive market would bear, just as the seller of any other product
could (like the seller pursuing profit by improving product quality) attempt to sell the
product at a price above the competitive market price. But the result in either case would
be the same: the polluter/seller would be left in possession of an unsold unit of
pollution/goods, since no buyer will agree to accept it when other units of pollution/goods
are available at a more attractive price. The firm that seeks profit by imposing costs of
pollution on third parties, like the firm that seeks profit by improving quality, can attempt
to profit through this tactic, but will be unsuccessful due to the nature of the conditions of
perfect competition. Hence, it does not appear that this way of distinguishing different
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notions of possibility under perfect competition will allow us to separate the product
quality case from the pollution case in a way that will salvage the perfect competition
principle or a version of the MFA that relies on it.

b. Schumpeterian versus Kirznerian views of entrepreneurship
If the perfect competition principle cannot account for the ethical difference
between competing on product quality and competing by polluting (beyond the socially
optimal amount), then it clearly fails as a principle for identifying preferred and nonpreferred strategic tactics. But perhaps the perfect competition principle is the wrong way
to interpret the MFA. My own close reading of Heath’s work has convinced me that it
has the strongest textual support of any alternative interpretation. But maybe I am
missing something. Maybe there is another way of interpreting them that yields a more
promising principle, or maybe there are other passages in Heath’s work that point toward
the kind of principle we are looking for.
However, I am skeptical that the MFA will yield a better principle (unless we
interpret it to already contain a principle resembling the wealth creation ones that I
suggest below). The MFA, at least insofar as it emphasizes the conditions of perfect
competition that guarantee Pareto efficiency when the market reaches equilibrium, only
focuses on a certain sense in which market competition is beneficial. It will be helpful to
invoke a distinction from the entrepreneurship literature to illustrate this point.
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Kirzner (1997) argues that we should understand entrepreneurship as a process
that pushes markets toward a hypothetical competitive equilibrium state. Entrepreneurs
discover market inefficiencies—products that consumers would want and are possible to
make but are not being provided, producers who value a scarce resource more than those
who are currently using it. These inefficiencies represent entrepreneurial opportunities,
and the entrepreneurs who seize them are rewarded with profits as they iron out markets
in which they participate toward competitive equilibrium.
Schumpeter (1947, 2010), by contrast, identifies entrepreneurship as a process
that disrupts market equilibrium. Entrepreneurs carry out innovations—new goods, new
methods of production, new forms of organization—that shock the markets in which they
are introduced out of their equilibrium states. Entrepreneurship is an example of the
creative destruction (to use Schumpeter’s term) process by which market systems
facilitate the displacement of outmoded, inefficient ways of doing business by new,
improved ways of doing business.
The MFA adopts a perspective about markets and how they produce benefits that
is similar to the Kirznerian understanding of entrepreneurship. Having actors in
competitive markets pursue profit is desirable because it eliminates wasteful
inefficiencies from the market, bringing the system as a whole closer to Pareto-efficient
equilibrium. Eliminating inefficiencies is indeed a valuable feature of competitive
markets; this I do not dispute. However, as Schumpeter teaches us, eliminating
inefficiencies is not the only, or even the main, valuable feature of markets. Competitive
markets are also valuable because they foster innovation. But we cannot account for the
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value of innovation by appeal to the desirability of getting closer to the Pareto frontier.
Schumpeter emphasizes how the market disruptions innovation causes often result in the
market being drawn, at least temporarily, away from its Pareto-efficient competitive
equilibrium. Equilibrium-seeking, Kirznerian market processes will tend to draw the
market back toward Pareto-efficient equilibrium in the wake of disruption. But the
innovation itself does not facilitate this—indeed, Pareto-efficient equilibrium is the very
thing it disrupts. If we want to be able to explain the value of innovative activities, such
as a firm’s discovery of a new product design that allows it to produce a better quality
product than its rivals, then we need to reference something other than the desirability of
getting closer to Pareto efficient market equilibrium.

c. The Pareto frontier
This point can be put slightly differently by appealing to the notion of a Pareto
frontier. A Pareto frontier is a graphical representation of all possible Pareto efficient
allocations (see Fig. 1). By identifying the goal or ‘point’ of the market economy as the
achievement of Pareto efficiency, the MFA justifies the restrictions it imposes on how
market actors may pursue profit on the grounds that market actors’ adherence to them
“gets us as close to the Pareto frontier as possible” (Singer, 2018: 111). Desirable sets of
restrictions will be those that move the economy from Pareto sub-optimal states like n in
Fig. 1 closer to the Pareto frontier.
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Fig. 1: The Pareto frontier
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Suppose the current state of the economy is at a Pareto sub-optimal state like n in
Fig. 1. Application of the First Fundamental Theorem would have us understand this as a
failure of markets to reach their perfectly competitive equilibrium: if the perfectly
competitive equilibrium is achieved, the First Fundamental Theorem implies that the state
of the economy should lie somewhere on the Pareto frontier, rather than below it. Of
course, there are many reasons, under the First Fundamental Theorem, why a given
Pareto sub-optimal economy fails to reach the Pareto frontier. One might be that
competitive market processes have not yet had time to iron out existing inefficiencies.
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Perhaps firms in a market with reasonably competitive features have not yet had time to
determine their optimal pricing strategy, and there are appropriable economic rents
available for firms that do a better job of competing on price.
Basic economics allows us to demonstrate how firms competing on price in a
market like this will move the state of the economy closer to the Pareto frontier. (Note
that this analysis is subject to second-best caveats, but again, for the sake of simplicity, I
am ignoring those for now.)

Fig. 2: Consumer and producer surplus
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Fig. 3: Deadweight loss
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Suppose that our imaginary Pareto-sub optimal market can be represented by Fig. 3.
Prices in the market are at level p1, which is higher than p, the price level in the perfectly
competitive market depicted in Fig. 2. When price is p1, quantity exchanged is q1, which
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is lower than the quantity q exchanged when price is p. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 illustrate the
consumer and producer surplus realized when goods are exchanged in this market. This
surplus represents the difference between the highest price that consumers occupying
various points on the demand curve are willing to pay for goods and the lowest price at
which producers occupying various points on the supply curve are willing to sell the
good.
Note that Fig. 3 has deadweight loss in the triangle to the right of the vertical line
representing q1, whereas in Fig. 2 this area is consumer surplus. This represents the fact
that there are consumers in Fig. 3 (occupying points on the demand curve that lie between
q1 and q) who are willing to buy goods at a price at which sellers occupying the
corresponding points on the supply curve would be willing to sell them. However,
because in Fig. 3 competitive market pressures have not yet pushed the price from p1 to p
and quantity from q1 to q, there are unrealized mutually-beneficial transactions in Fig. 3.
The deadweight loss triangle in Fig. 3 represents these unrealized transactions. This
analysis shows us why competing on price is a preferred strategy: It pushes markets
occupying inefficient states like the one represented by the Fig. 3 graph or by point n in
Fig. 1 toward the efficient states represented in Fig. 2 or by the Pareto frontier in Fig. 1.
The Paretian approach thus seems to be able to justify competing on price.
This sort of justification, however, is not available for product quality
improvement. Improving product quality generally does not eliminate the deadweight
loss in markets like the one depicted in Fig. 3 or move the economy from sub-optimal
points like n in Fig. 1 to the Pareto frontier. The economic effect of attempting to profit
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by introducing an improved-quality product is captured in Fig. 1 by moving the Pareto
frontier outward to pf2. We cannot account for the value of this by appealing to First
Fundamental Theorem’s explanation of how markets at perfectly competitive equilibrium
are Pareto efficient. Indeed, if sub-optimal point n in Fig. 1 represents the state of
economy, and successful employment of a product quality improvement tactic pushes the
Pareto frontier outward to pf2 without simultaneously moving point n outward by the
same amount, then the state of the economy post-product quality improvement will be
further from the Pareto frontier than it was pre-product quality improvement. A firm in a
perfectly competitive market like the one depicted in Fig. 2 that successfully pursues a
product quality improvement will create a situation with deadweight loss, like in Fig. 3,
where none existed before (assuming rivals cannot instantly copy the improvement and
compete away the entrepreneurial profits of the firm that innovated the improved-quality
product).
Let me be clear: I do not wish to claim that Heath holds the (absurd on its face)
position that product quality improvement is not a preferred tactic. His explicit claim to
the contrary is strong evidence against interpreting him in this way. My claim, rather, is
that the Paretian principles Heath relies on to distinguish preferred from non-preferred
tactics are inadequate. Heath claims that competitive market institutions are valuable
because they eliminate deadweight loss, move the market closer to the Pareto frontier,
and “ensure the smooth operation of the price system” (Heath, 2006: 541). These are all
different ways of appealing to the desirability of reaching Pareto efficiency. But market
institutions, I claim, are valuable not just because they tend toward Pareto efficiency, but
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also because they push the Pareto frontier outward. The Paretian principles Heath
emphasizes cannot account for this, and they thus cannot account for the desirability of
preferred tactics like product quality improvement that have this effect. Addressing this
problem requires a different approach.

V. Wealth creation
My positive proposal in this paper is that we should look to the value of wealth
creation, rather Pareto improvement, to explain much of what the MFA purports to
illuminate: the point of the market economy, what justifies the profit motive in the
context of a market economic system, and how we should differentiate between preferred
and non-preferred tactics for pursuing profit.
Readers who are sympathetic to the wealth creation view I propose, but who want
to be as charitable as possible to Heath, might wonder whether Heath himself actually
accepts something like the wealth standard I recommend. Heath, however, comes close to
explicitly rejecting a wealth standard in the introduction of his book on the MFA.
Underscoring the Paretian foundation of his approach, he writes that economic
“efficiency is often conflated with… the wealth-maximization standard proposed by ‘law
and economics’ scholars” such as Posner (1973), and insists that “I use the term
‘efficiency,’ by contrast, in the strict Pareto sense, to refer to the principle that, whenever
it is possible to improve at least one person’s condition without worsening anyone else’s
it is better to do so than not” (Heath, 2014: 9–10). The wealth-based approach I propose
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in this paper differs from Posner’s; among other things, it does not countenance wealth
maximization. Nevertheless, the fact that Heath only invokes a wealth standard to caution
against what he views to be a misreading of his view would seem to provide ample
reason against interpreting him as advocating a wealth standard.
It is possible that Heath rejects wealth maximization as a general standard in the
way Posner uses it, but would be amenable to the more pluralistic, less all-encompassing
wealth-based approach I advocate below. As I show, we retain many of the attractive
features of Heath’s Paretian MFA by adopting wealth creation as a guiding value for
business ethics. Thus, I want to avoid overstating the tensions between my approach and
Heath’s—perhaps he would agree with much of what I advocate. I do believe, however,
that we can infer from Heath’s written work that the MFA he envisions differs in at least
some important ways from the wealth creation approach I explain and defend here.

a. What is wealth?
Wealth refers to the all-purpose economic means that people may use to pursue
their ends, usually by engaging in exchange with others. Thus, something counts as
wealth if it possesses economic value. Tangible examples of wealth include consumer
goods, productive assets, and land. But wealth also includes intangible things like ideas,
productive processes, social capital, and human capital.
Because my discussion here focuses on the idea of creating wealth, it will be
useful to identify two different ways we might try to measure wealth for the purpose of
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defining what it means to have more or less of it. We can measure wealth by focusing on
either exchange value or use value (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; Lepak, Smith, &
Taylor, 2007). The exchange value of a good is determined by the price it commands on a
given market. The use value of a good is determined by the maximum amount that
someone is willing to pay for it. Suppose you pay $1 for an apple at the supermarket, and
that you value the apple at $2 (i.e. you are indifferent between having $2 and having the
apple). The exchange value of the apple in this example is $1, and the use value is $2.
Wealth is a stock rather than a flow. An individual’s wealth is determined by what
they own, not what their annual income is. A country’s wealth is determined by what its
members own, not by its gross domestic product. Of course, how much an individual or
group owns will usually be a function of how much value flows to them in the form of
income. But strictly speaking, this income stream does not itself constitute a person’s
wealth.
The general position I am defending is that wealth creation is an important
guiding value for understanding ethical constraints on how profit may be pursued in
markets. The specific content of this general position will depend on the precise version
of ‘wealth’ one adopts. In the discussion that follows, I adopt a conception of wealth as
potential preference satisfaction as specified by the Kaldor-Hicks standard, and a
conception of wealth creation as Kaldor-Hicks improvements. This view involves a
simple, though significant, modification of Heath’s Paretian MFA. What I propose can
thus be understood as a friendly amendment to the MFA. There are, however, some
persuasive objections to the conventional economic understanding of welfare as
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subjective preference satisfaction upon which the conventional Kaldor-Hicks standard
relies. As I show, a plausible view emerges if we accommodate some of these objections.

b. The Kaldor-Hicks standard
Kaldor-Hicks improvements are defined in terms of hypothetical Pareto
improvements:
Kaldor-Hicks improvement: A state of economic distribution B is a
Kaldor-Hicks improvement over another state A if agents whose utilities are
higher in B than in A could hypothetically compensate agents whose utilities
are lower in B than A so that B would qualify as a Pareto improvement
compared to A.

In somewhat more colloquial terms, B is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement over A if there are
enough economically valuable things in B relative to A that, through hypothetical
redistribution, everyone in B could be made at least as well off as they would be in A.
The Kaldor-Hicks standard gives us a criterion for comparing the amount of
wealth between different states. If state B represents a Kaldor-Hicks improvement over
state A, then there is more wealth in B than A. Wealth is thus a function of agents’
relative preference satisfactions, weighed against each other in the way the Kaldor-Hicks
standard specifies. If an agent prefers a set of possessions Y over an alternative set of
possessions Z, then that agent has more wealth if she has Y than Z. If a state of economic
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distribution B is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement over another state A, then there is more
wealth in B than in A.
One inconvenient feature of the Pareto standard is that many states are Pareto
non-comparable (Buchanan, 1985; Hausman, McPherson, & Satz, 2016; Sen, 1991). For
example, if one agent has a higher utility in A than B, and another agent has a higher
utility in B then A, then neither is a Pareto improvement over the other. The KaldorHicks standard, on the other hand, can make pairwise comparisons between all states of
economic distribution that are inhabited by the same agents.

c. Reservations about Kaldor-Hicks
However, the conventional Kaldor-Hicks standard also has some drawbacks due
to its reliance on the problematic theory of welfare that underlies much of modern
economics. Thus, given that I am looking for a standard that will inform ethical
judgments about permissible and impermissible tactics for pursuing profit in a market,
Kaldor-Hicks does not provide an entirely adequate understanding of wealth creation.
Conventional welfare economics measures welfare in terms of subjective
preference satisfaction. However, if we understand wealth in this way, we cannot
distinguish between the different ways people acquire their preferences. Such distinctions
are crucial for any conception of wealth creation that bears ethical significance. For
example, there is clearly an ethically relevant difference between a preference that cannot
secure the rational endorsement of the preference-holder (e.g. because it is the result of
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manipulative advertising) versus a preference that is rationally accepted (or at least not
rejected) by the preference-holder (Crisp, 1987). If Kaldor-Hicks cannot distinguish the
former from the latter, it will overweight the ethical importance of fulfilling preferences
that are irrational, non-autonomous, or whose fulfillment would be against the interests of
the preference-holder.
Thus, a fully developed wealth creation approach will need a theory of welfare
that can make these sorts of distinctions. I cannot provide such an account here, but I
confident that one exists, at least in principle. One option, outlined by Arneson (2000),
would be to adopt an objective list of things that contribute to welfare—Arneson offers
“engagement in relations of love and friendship and intellectual and cultural
achievement” (514) as examples. One might add to the list some items that intersect more
with economic life than Arneson’s examples. For instance: living a normal-length human
life, maintaining good health, finding fulfillment, achieving valuable things, acting
autonomously and rationally. (This list roughly tracks some of the central human
capabilities from [Nussbaum, 2001], though her approach has some deeper theoretical
differences from theories of welfare as traditionally construed.) Alternatively, one might
choose to hew closer to a conventional Kaldor-Hicks account of wealth creation by
limiting which subjective preferences are relevant, rather than discarding them altogether.
For example, we could exclude subjective preferences that result from manipulative
advertising, or that the individual preference-holder would herself reject.
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d. The Wealth Creation Principle
I have spoken of product quality improvement as a tactic a firm may use to pursue
profit. Strictly speaking, however, pursuing profit through product quality improvement
involves at least two distinct tactics: (a) improving some aspect of a product in the eyes
of some customers so that the willingness of those customers to pay for the product
increases, and (b) choosing the price at which the product is offered for sale. The former
is a wealth creation tactic, while the latter is a wealth appropriation tactic (Lepak et al.,
2007). Wealth creation tactics create wealth by increasing customer willingness to pay
for a firm’s products or by increasing the efficiency (thereby decreasing costs) associated
with production and distribution. Wealth appropriation tactics appropriate wealth on the
part of the firm that would otherwise accrue to some other party.
In many cases, for it to be in a firm’s financial interest to implement a wealth
creation tactic, that tactic will need to be combined with a wealth appropriation tactic. In
the long run, a firm will only gain financially from selling a superior-quality product if it
is at least able to set its prices high enough to cover its costs. In the likely event that the
firm’s wealth creation tactic involves undertaking risky investments, the firm will also
need to appropriate an additional risk premium for the investments to be ex ante
financially justified. To pursue profit successfully, firms must adopt tactics for both
wealth creation and wealth appropriation.
If our goal is to identify a wealth-based principle that distinguishes permissible
tactics for pursuing profit from impermissible ones, we cannot consider wealth creation
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tactics and wealth appropriation tactics in isolation of each other. Wealth appropriation
tactics often reduce overall wealth relative to if they were not employed at all. Consider
the wealth appropriation tactic of increasing prices. In perfectly competitive equilibrium,
all firms have total revenues that are just high enough to cover their costs (including costs
of capital), but no higher. (Under perfect competition, the economic rents appropriated by
a firm that brings in revenue in excess of its costs will be competed away by rivals or new
entrants.) In other words, firms under perfect competition achieve zero economic profit
(i.e. profit in excess of costs of capital). Imagine a zero-profit firm that prices its products
just high enough to cover its costs. Suppose market conditions change so that the
conditions of perfect competition no longer hold, allowing this firm to raise its prices and
achieve positive economic profit. Absent specific market conditions, this price increase
will cause deadweight loss: potential mutually-beneficial transactions will not occur,
because buyers whose maximum willingness to pay was greater than the price level when
the firm was just barely covering its costs, but lower than the increased price, will no
longer purchase the product. There is less wealth after the firm employs its wealth
appropriation tactic than before. Thus, if we apply a wealth standard to wealth
appropriation tactics in isolation, we risk judging all or most wealth appropriation tactics
impermissible.
This seems overly restrictive. Perhaps there is something to be said, ethically
speaking, for a firm that voluntarily forgoes profit and keeps its prices at a level just high
enough to cover its costs. But making this an ethical requirement seems both
unintuitively demanding and prevents us from making the sorts of ethical distinctions
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between permissible and impermissible tactics for pursuing profit that motivated this
paper in the first place. Fortunately, we can avoid this result by evaluating tactics for
appropriating wealth in the context of the wealth creation tactics that often accompany
them, rather than in isolation.
How wealth appropriation and wealth creation tactics should be combined is a
tricky question. Precise answers are illusive. However, to gain some clarity on this issue,
I propose that we group tactics together into what I will call strategic sets. A strategic set
of tactics contains one or more wealth creation tactics, plus wealth appropriation tactics
that are necessary for the wealth creation tactics in the set to be in the strategic interest of
the firm to employ. Thus, when a firm pursues profit by improving the quality of one of
its products, the resulting strategic set of tactics will include (a) the wealth-creating tactic
of improving the quality of the product and (b) the wealth appropriating tactic of setting
the price of that product so that the firm captures a portion of the value it creates. These
two tactics should be evaluated together. They should also be evaluated separately from
other strategic sets of tactics the firm employs. For example, if the firm undertakes
another quality improvement for an unrelated product, the two strategic sets of tactics that
constitute the two different product quality improvements should be evaluated separately.
Having made these preliminary remarks, I propose the following principle for
distinguishing permissible and impermissible tactics for pursuing profit:
Wealth Creation Principle: It is impermissible for a firm to employ
strategic sets of tactics that are expected to appropriate more wealth than
they create.
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The Wealth Creation Principle can explain our intuitions regarding Easy Cases. As the
above remarks suggest, product quality improvements are judged permissible because,
absent serious market failure (e.g. a quality improvement that introduces or exacerbates
an especially costly negative externality), a firm that implements a product quality
improvement will create more wealth than it appropriates. The wealth created by
increasing some customers’ willingness to pay will be greater than the wealth the firm
appropriates through its pricing (see Brandenburger & Stuart, 1996).
Conversely, strategic sets of tactics involving collusion and contrived deterrence
will typically be impermissible under the Wealth Creation Principle. When executed
successfully, these tactics destroy wealth overall by creating deadweight loss and failing
to create additional wealth. Because firms that employ collusion and contrived deterrence
successfully appropriate some wealth while creating negative wealth, they appropriate
more wealth than they create and run afoul of the Wealth Creation Principle.
I am also optimistic that the Wealth Creation Principle points us in a plausible
direction for analyzing Hard Cases. Evaluating whether the firm in Small Town Stores
acted permissibly would require identifying the firm’s wealth creation and appropriation
tactics and placing them into strategic sets, and then gathering the information necessary
to compare appropriated wealth to created wealth for each set. This will not be an easy
task, and the final ethical judgments will depend on the specifics of the case.
Nevertheless, the Wealth Creation Principle seems to contain a plausible and tractable
way to analyze even Hard Cases.
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The Wealth Creation Principle does have some important limits. It provides
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a strategic set of tactics being ethical
overall. It is rather a supporting condition: the fact that a strategic set of tactics satisfies it
counts in favor of its ethical permissibility, and the fact that a set violates it counts
against its permissibility. This is as it should be. The principle is based on wealth, but
wealth clearly cannot explain everything in business ethics. Lying is usually wrong, and a
strategic set of tactics that included a serious lie would usually be wrong to employ even
if it created wealth overall. Strategic business decisions will often implicate
considerations apart from just wealth. Making such decisions in an ethical way will
require more than simply abiding by the Wealth Creation Principle. Still, a wealth
creation approach makes sense in the domain of business ethics because, as I discuss in
the next section, wealth is especially important for explaining and justifying ethical
norms in business and market contexts. Part of the explanatory value of a wealth creation
approach is that much of what it explains is counterintuitive. People often have difficulty
understanding how competitive, profit-oriented market activity could possibly be
ethical—this may explain the common suggestion that business ethics involves an
inherent contradiction or oxymoron. An appreciation of the ethical value of wealth
creation, and the way in which profit-seeking actors in reasonably competitive market
institutions facilitate wealth creation, helps resolve this apparent tension. It is true that
wealth creation cannot explain everything in business ethics. On the other hand, what it
does explain is important.
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Moral philosophers distinguish between ethical principles as criteria of the right
versus ethical principles as decision procedures. Criteria of the right tell us what the
conditions are for an act to count as morally right (e.g. that it maximizes overall utility, or
that it follows from Kant’s Categorical Imperative). Decision procedures provide
practical guidance to people that is supposed to induce them to engage in better moral
behavior (Brink, 1986; Railton, 1984; Rawls, 1951). As I understand the Wealth Creation
Principle, it falls somewhere between the poles of this spectrum. Unlike a pure decision
procedure, the Principle does not give detailed prescriptive guidance that could plausibly
replace an individual’s moral judgment regarding what to do and care about. Like a
decision procedure, the Principle does serve as a source of practical guidance. It
highlights certain contours of the moral terrain that are especially important for decisions
in business and market contexts. Unlike a pure criterion of the right, the Principle does
not provide necessary or sufficient conditions for an act to qualify as ethically right.
However, as I show below, the Principle does track moral considerations that are
intrinsically important. It is not a noble lie whose aim is purely to induce better behavior
in people who adopt it (Plato, 2004). The Wealth Creation Principle identifies an
important moral consideration that is relevant to what agents ought to do, particularly in
business and market domains. Competing moral considerations can outweigh it, but
absent competing moral considerations, compliance with the Principle becomes morally
obligatory.
Another objection to the Wealth Creation Principle is that it requires a baseline,
and that I have failed to provide one. The Wealth Creation Principle says that doing
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business ethically means refraining from opportunities to profit that destroy wealth. But
destroy wealth relative to what? Consider:
State-Sanctioned Monopolist: a firm in a crony-capitalist economy enjoys
regulatory privileges that give it an effective monopoly in its industry.
Reformers take over the government and eliminate these regulatory
privileges. However, the firm has enough advantages, even in the absence of
regulatory protection, to effectively deter rivals from entering its industry.
If this firm merely refrains from employing further strategic sets of tactics that
appropriate more wealth than they create, it will still benefit from the privilege it enjoys
as a vestige of its former state-sanctioned monopolist status. Shouldn’t the firm be
required to do more than this to rectify this unjust heritage of its crony-capitalist past?
And won’t determining how much more the firm must do require the sort of baseline that
the objection envisions?
My response is that, properly understood, the Wealth Creation Principle already
contains such a baseline. The principle insists that firms refrain from employing strategic
sets of tactics that appropriate more wealth than they create. This does not just implicate
sets of tactics the firm is considering implementing in the future; it also implicates the
sets of tactics the firm currently has in place. To determine what the Wealth Creation
Principle would require of the firm in State-Sanctioned Monopolist, one would need to
define the firm’s strategic set of tactics and estimate whether, for each individual set, it
appropriates more wealth than it creates. If it does, then the Wealth Creation Principle
demands that the firm give up that set of tactics. Notice how strict the requirements are
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that this standard imposes on incumbent firms that enjoy a significant degree of
monopoly power. The Wealth Creation Principle requires that wealth-appropriating
tactics (such as price increases) be matched with wealth-creating tactics (such as quality
improvements). But firms with significant monopoly power often engage in wealth
appropriation without accompanying wealth creation. For example, a monopolist will
often raise its prices far above the level that would prevail under conditions of perfect
competition, thereby causing and exacerbating deadweight loss. For the Wealth Creation
Principle to judge such price increases permissible, the monopolist would be required to
combine them with wealth-creating tactics in strategic sets of overall tactics where, for
each individual set, that set is expected to create more wealth than it appropriates. The
wealth creation principle thus forbids simple cases of monopolists raising their prices
simply because they can. Simple price increases appropriate wealth without creating any
wealth at all. If the firm in State-Sanctioned Monopolist engaged in such price increases
in the past, and has sustained them without any change in its other operations that might
satisfy the Wealth Creation Principle, then the Wealth Creation Principle will prohibit the
firm from maintaining those monopoly prices.
These refinements aside, I hope it is clear that the Wealth Creation Principle at the
very least succeeds where the MFA fails: it provides a way of distinguishing between
preferred and non-preferred tactics for pursuing profit in a market. Preferred strategic sets
of tactics create more wealth than they appropriate, while non-preferred strategic sets of
tactics appropriate more wealth than they create.
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VI. The ethical importance of wealth
I have argued that wealth creation, rather than any Paretian principle, provides the
best explanation for what distinguishes preferred and non-preferred tactics for pursuing
profit. If wealth considerations play such an important role in justifying ethical norms
governing pursuit of profit in a market, then wealth must have significant ethical
importance. But does it? Some are skeptical (Dworkin, 1980; Jones et al., 2016; Jones &
Felps, 2013). However, I maintain that, as a society, we have stronger ethical reasons
than critics recognize for promoting wealth creation through our economic institutions
and the business activity that occurs within them.

a. The overlapping consensus in support of wealth creation
Libertarian political philosophers often appeal to wealth creation as a reason for
endorsing institutions like private property and free markets (e.g. Schmidtz & Brennan,
2011; Van der Vossen & Brennan, 2018). For this reason, it may be tempting to conceive
of a wealth creation approach to business ethics as a specifically libertarian way of
understanding business ethics. However, while a strong emphasis on wealth creation is
likely to appeal to many libertarians, as well as the specific sort of economic libertarian
traditionally associated with the fields of economics and finance, it does not require one
to adopt any particularly controversial or strong libertarian premises.
Indeed, John Rawls, one of the most important left-liberal political philosophers
of the twentieth century, identified wealth creation as a sort of fundamental political
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value. According to Rawls, it is in the interest of individual members of society to have
greater access to primary social goods. For the purpose of shaping society’s political
institutions, we evaluate how well-off individual members of society are under various
institutional regimes by evaluating how much access to primary goods they enjoy
(Wenar, 2017). Rawls’ list of primary social goods includes “[i]ncome and wealth,
understood as all-purpose means (having an exchange value) generally needed to achieve
a wide range of ends whatever they may be” (Rawls, 2001: 58–59). Of course, Rawls
places strict limits, contained in his two principles of justice, on how primary goods may
be distributed. But he still endorses wealth as something citizens have a fundamental
interest in having more of, and as something political institutions should promote so long
as the two principles of justice are satisfied.
That both the left-liberal Rawls and libertarians like Brennan, Schmidtz, and Van
der Vossen affirm the importance of wealth creation as a goal for political and economic
institutions suggests that wealth creation can be endorsed from a range of moral and
political perspectives. Those who disagree on deep questions about value in political
philosophy might nevertheless arrive at substantial agreement about the value of fostering
wealth creation. A similar overlapping endorsement of wealth creation is possible starting
from the premises of various prominent moral theories. There is a strong consequentialist
case for promoting wealth creation: wealthier people generally report greater levels of
subjective well-being (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2013), and societies that generate large
amounts wealth have a greater ability to protect and promote the well-being and
functioning of their members (Cahill, 2005; McGillivray, 1991). But one who follows
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Rawls (2009) in rejecting consequentialism can still find ample reason for endorsing
wealth creation as an important moral value to the extent to which societies with greater
levels of wealth are better able to promote and protect values like autonomy or human
flourishing. (Pluralist consequentialists can endorse these values as among those worth
promoting, but they tend to take a more central role in approaches to political philosophy
whose adherents take themselves to be opposed to consequentialism, e.g. autonomy in
Rawls’ Kant-inspired theory of justice.) Rigorously demonstrating the connection
between greater wealth and the increased realization of the values of autonomy and
human flourishing is a task that extends beyond the scope of this paper. My point here is
simply that the ethical importance of wealth can be supported by reference to a range of
deeper ethical values. Even those who disagree about why wealth is valuable can agree
that it is valuable.

b. Positive freedom
There is one value whose justificatory relationship to wealth creation is worth
drawing out a bit more fully: positive freedom. Positive freedom is understood by
contrast to negative freedom, which refers to the absence of coercive interference. As
Elizabeth Anderson explains it, “If you have positive freedom, you have a rich menu of
options effectively accessible to you” (Anderson, 2015: 100). A person has positive
freedom to the extent that they enjoy the effective power to act or pursue their ends
(Gaus, Courtland, & Schmidtz, 2015).
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If positive freedom is intrinsically valuable, then wealth must at least be of
instrumental value. Greater wealth correlates with greater positive freedom: holding all
else equal, the more wealth a person has, the more options she has available to her, and
the greater her ability to realize her conception of the good life.
Is wealth’s value merely instrumental? I think not. Indeed, there are strong
reasons for thinking that wealth is not merely of instrumental importance for positive
freedom, but that it actually constitutes positive freedom. Following G. A. Cohen, we
might compare having wealth to having tickets that allow us to do things we otherwise
would lack the freedom to do. Wealth is “nothing but a highly generalized form of… a
ticket” that gives its owner “a license to perform a disjunction of conjunctions of
actions—actions, like, for example, visiting one’s sister in Bristol, or taking home, and
wearing, the sweater on the counter at Selfridge’s” (Cohen, 1995: 58). A person who
does not have enough wealth to trade in exchange for a department store sweater lacks
the positive freedom to take home and wear that sweater. If he tries to take it home and
wear it, he can expect to face physical coercion that prevents him from succeeding. But if
he has a sufficient level of wealth to trade for the sweater, ‘taking home and wearing the
sweater’ is added to his menu of potential options. People with greater wealth enjoy more
real options about what sort of life to lead, what sort of person to become, and what to do
at a given moment (Brennan, 2012). Wealth, then, is not just an instrument to achieving
greater positive freedom; in an important sense it is a form positive freedom. Thus, if we
have reason to shape our political and economic institutions in a way that promotes
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positive freedom, we have reason to shape those institutions in a way that promotes the
creation of greater levels of wealth.

c. The importance of wealth in business ethics
Even those who accept that our political and economic institutions ought to
promote positive freedom, and accept that wealth constitutes positive freedom, may balk
at the emphasis I place upon wealth in this paper. After all, wealth is clearly inadequate
as a general standard of justice. Consider the following example adapted from Émile
Zola’s Germinal, a novel about a harsh coal miner’s strike in 19th century northern
France:
Rich Get Richer: The fabulously wealthy Grégoire family owns the Voreux coal
mine, which employs hundreds of workers who spend their lives in poverty and
toil in hazardous conditions in the mine. The Grégoires change the mine’s
compensation policy in a way that increases overall production, as well as profits
for the Grégoire family, while decreasing each worker’s take home pay. The
change in compensation increases the wealth of the Grégoire family by more than
it reduces the overall wealth of the workers. Thus, it creates wealth.

One struggles to imagine what kind of ethics- or justice-related reason could support the
change in compensation in Rich Get Richer. The deprivation of the coal miners is
worsened for the benefit of the Grégoires’ already vast fortune. Rich Get Richer appears
to function as a reductio ad absurdum of wealth as a general standard of justice.
I agree wholeheartedly that wealth must be rejected as a general standard of
justice. We cannot infer from the fact that society E has more wealth than society F that E
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is a more just society than F. However, wealth can still be a component of justice without
being a general standard of justice. Wealth is a component of justice so long as greater
wealth tends to contribute to greater justice.
Greater wealth indeed tends to contribute to greater justice, all else equal. In
large-scale, modern societies, a certain minimal level of wealth is required to enable
members of society to meet their basic needs—e.g. for water, nutrition, basic education,
health care, and shelter. Beyond basic needs, as the previous section argues, wealth
contributes to justice by promoting the positive freedom of the individual members of
society. People who have greater wealth have greater effective ability to pursue their
passions and projects, enjoy their leisure time, and spend time with their loved ones. Of
course, all else is often not equal. Wealth can be problematic from the point of view of
justice when it allows some people to buy political power and corrupt a society’s
government in order to further promote ends. More generally, large inequalities in wealth
may allow citizens with great wealth to dominate and oppress citizens who lack wealth.
But the existence of such cases does not undermine the place of wealth creation in the set
of overall goals that modern societies ought to pursue. They only specify certain
instances of wealth creation in certain contexts where countervailing considerations
override reasons in favor of promoting the creation of wealth. They do not show that
society should not pursue wealth as a general matter.
I have argued that firms have a presumptive duty to conform their conduct to the
Wealth Creation Principle. That this duty is presumptive means that it can be overridden
by competing considerations. The nature and strength of countervailing considerations
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will depend upon, among other things, how just the society is within which a firm
operates. In an ideal society, one in which we could trust that political, social, and
economic institutions function well enough to ensure justice, for-profit firms would
perhaps be justified pursuing profit maximally within the bounds of the minimal limits
contained within the Wealth Creation Principle and other basic ethical principles and
values: e.g. honoring commitments, avoiding fraud and deception, and refraining from
wrongful harms and rights violations.
In the non-ideal real world contexts, of course, political, social, and economic
institutions do not function perfectly, and firms cannot simply depend on other
institutional actors to protect justice and equality. There will be times when, for reasons
Singer (2018) explains, justice or equality-based reasons will be the countervailing
considerations that override the pro tanto desirability of certain instances of wealth
creation. Rich Get Richer would likely qualify as one such case: the moral goodness of
wealth being created is outweighed by the potential moral badness of an already powerful
economic actor who exploits dominating relationships with vulnerable others for its own
benefit gaining even more power, allowing it to exercise even greater domination
(Anderson, 2017). But again, the existence of such cases does not undermine the Wealth
Creation Principle as a mid-level principle for business ethics that provides actors with
presumptive reasons to act in certain ways. Nor does it undermine wealth’s status as an
important guiding value for business ethics.
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VII: Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that business ethics cannot be Paretian. Paretian
principles fail to provide a plausible way of distinguishing between permissible and
impermissible tactics for pursuing profit in a market. Focusing on wealth creation
provides a better way of understanding the ethics of market competition.
Of course, one could accept all of this and still maintain a broadly Paretian view
about the overall political and economic institutions of society. Over time, these
institutions should generate broad prosperity, finding ways to make most members of
society (especially the less well-off) better off, and not doing so at the expense of any
particular individual or group. Having a society that repeatedly makes Pareto
improvements, however, requires a capacity to create wealth. Creating wealth requires
market institutions. And market institutions cannot function effectively if market actors
are only permitted to employ tactics that cause Pareto improvements.
If this is right, then having a broadly Paretian society requires something closer to
the Wealth Creation Principle than any principle that is recognizably Paretian for
determining the ethical constraints on market competition. The Wealth Creation Principle
may seem lax in comparison to Paretian principles, but it places important restrictions on
the tactics managers may use to pursue profit for their firms. Though it is by no means a
sufficient principle for business ethics, it does forbid some especially problematic kinds
of business behavior that scholars of institutions have shown can inhibit societies’ efforts
to become peaceful, prosperous, and just. The Wealth Creation Principle requires that
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business firms conduct themselves as inclusive institutions that that produce wealth for
society, rather than extractive institutions that use their power to appropriate wealth that
others produce (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013). It requires that business firms seek
economic success through productive, rather than unproductive or destructive,
entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1996). To comply with the principle, managers must ensure
that their firms’ business activities contribute to the overall prosperity of society, rather
than immiserating it for private gain. That may not be all that business ethics is (or should
be) about, but it is surely an important part of it.
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CHAPTER 4: Conclusion

By way of conclusion, I will briefly note what I consider to be three of the most
important lessons that can be taken from the above three essays.
First, as essay 3 argues, an adequate ethical understanding of business requires
understanding the means by which profit-oriented business activity contributes to the
creation of wealth. Individual market transactions often create winners and losers in a
way that seems intuitively objectionable. Understanding how these transactions facilitate
the creation of wealth overall contributes to our understanding of why these intuitively
objectionable market transactions are often justified, as well as why they sometimes are
not.
Second, as essays 1 and 2 argue, when we adopt a definition of CSR that is
decoupled from substantive ethical considerations, thinking about CSR primarily as a
source of strategic advantage can be dangerous. Even if we adopt a non-moralized
conception of CSR, normative theorizing about CSR must be based primarily on
substantive moral considerations, rather than on instrumental firm performance
considerations.
Third, as essay 2 argues, CSR programs often fail to live up to their potential
because they are rarely selected on the basis of comparative estimates (based on strong
evidence and rigorous analysis) of social impact. Normative CSR theory must recognize
and account for the vast amount of additional good that CSR initiatives could accomplish
if they took insights from effective altruism more seriously. Approaching CSR in this
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way need not be burdensome; any firm with resources to devote to beneficent CSR
causes can accomplish an enormous amount of social good simply by allocating its CSR
resources to effective charitable organizations.
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